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The exorbitant privilege literature analyzes the positive differential returns on 
net foreign assets enjoyed by the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century as the issuer of the global reserve currency. In the first age of international 
financial integration (1870-1914), the global reserve currency of the period was the 
British pound sterling. Whether the United Kingdom enjoyed a similar privilege is 
analyzed with a new dataset, encompassing microdata on railroad and government 
financial securities. The use of microdata avoids the flaws that have plagued the US 
studies, particularly the use of incompatible aggregate variables. New measures of 
Britain’s net external position provide estimates on capital gains and dividend yields.  
As the issuer of the global reserve currency, Britain received average revenues of 
13.4% of GDP from its international investment position. The country satisfied the 
necessary condition for the existence of an exorbitant privilege. Nonetheless, 
Britain’s case is slightly different from the American one. British external assets 
  
received higher returns than were paid on external liabilities for each class, but British 
invested mostly in securities with low profile of risk. The low return on its net 
external position meant that, for most of the time, Britain would not receive positive 
revenues from the rest of the world if it were a net debtor country, but this pattern 
changed after 1900. The finding supports the claim that, at least partially, exorbitant 
privilege is a general characteristic of the issuer of the global reserve currency and not 
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This work unravels the lessons of history to illuminate modern puzzles. For 
most of human history, people from different locations needed a common currency to 
trade. For thousands of years, frequent candidates were assets with an intrinsic value. 
The most famous “barbarous relic” was gold, which served as a means of exchange 
until the beginning of the twentieth century. The creation of a new international 
financial system in the second half of the twentieth century elevated the dollar to the 
core of international transactions. Since then, economists have struggled to 
understand how the fiat money (money established by law) from one country can be 
accepted by other countries, as well as the benefits enjoyed by the issuing country. A 
particular subset of those benefits came to be known as “exorbitant privilege”. This 
dissertation explains exorbitant privilege in a historical perspective, by comparing the 
benefits enjoyed by the US in the late twentieth century to the benefits enjoyed by the 
former issuer of the global reserve currency: Britain in the period 1870-1914. This 
work amalgamates three fields of economic literature: international finance, economic 
statistics and economic history. Statistics are a fundamental part of the process of 
reconstructing the financial environment of the period, in order to assess the 
importance of the pound sterling. I introduce a new database comprising almost the 
totality of the financial securities traded at the London Stock Exchange. The 
methodology to transform the dataset into statistics describing the British economy is 
also novel to the literature.  
Chapter 1 introduces the main concepts related to exorbitant privilege and a 




understanding of the international finance literature that follows and the possible 
definitions of exorbitant privilege.  Chapter 2 describes the economic environment of 
the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. It also 
delineates the procedures utilized to reach the main results presented in chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 further analyzes and develops the results of chapter 3 in order to deepen the 
insights of the benefits enjoyed by Britain. Chapter 5 provides a detailed description 
of the data sources in order to facilitate its use in future research, as well as the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the main research question and the concepts related to 
the analysis of exorbitant privilege. The first section explains the concepts and their 
application to the case of Britain between 1870 and 1914. The basic concepts are then 
translated into a formal accounting framework. With the help of the accounting 
framework, the literature on exorbitant privilege is explored in order to provide a 
benchmark for the results of the next chapters. 
Concepts 
The main question I wish to answer is whether the UK enjoyed an exorbitant 
privilege when the pound sterling was the main international currency in the period 
1870-1914.1  In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to define exorbitant 
privilege. There is no precise definition in the literature.  The concept of exorbitant 
privilege was introduced as a way to explain particular characteristics of the US of the 
late twentieth century. The United States dollar has been the main international 
currency since the Second World War and the creation of the Bretton Woods 
framework. Exorbitant privilege derives from the US dollar’s status as the main 
international currency: Over the postwar period the US has been able to borrow from 
                                                 
1 The main international currency is often referred to as the global reserve currency.  A reserve 
currency serves as a store of value in an international environment. A currency is selected as the 
preferred asset to save for a variety of reasons (financial sector development, institutions, military 
power, economic policies, importance in global trade, size of the economy, the lovely weather of a 
New Hampshire resort). The asset provides stable returns across states of nature or time. The currency 
is an instrument to acquire the safe asset, such as sovereign debt of the reserve country. In the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, US Treasury bills were regarded as the global safe asset and since 




abroad at low rates and invest abroad at higher rates (in terms of yields and returns); 
the difference is its “exorbitant privilege.”  
Unlike Britain before the First World War, the US utilized this return 
differential to finance a persistent current account deficit.2 The main goal of the US 
literature was not to explain the origin of exorbitant privilege, but rather to take it as 
given and to assess how it affects the dynamics and sustainability of the US external 
accounts. The notion of exorbitant privilege explained a particular American 
phenomenon: the financing of extraordinary consumption as manifested by the 
current account deficit. 
This work looks instead at the first age of international financial integration 
and financial account liberalization from 1871 to the outbreak of the First World War 
and the hegemon of that era, Britain, to assess if Britain also enjoyed an exorbitant 
privilege. The answer clarifies whether exorbitant privilege is a general characteristic 
of the issuer of the global reserve currency or if it is unique to the recent US. 3 I reach 
the answer by estimating the net revenues received from Britain’s external position.  
To accomplish this, I need first to establish evidence of a positive return 
differential between securities issued in the main international currency and similar 
securities issued in other currencies. I call this primitive concept “pure” exorbitant 
privilege. The most direct way to verify whether this phenomenon exists is by 
                                                 
2 For specific reasons explained in the next section, the return differential is also known as the 
valuation effect in the literature. On the United States, Gourinchas and Rey (2014) conclude: 
“Valuation effects (…) account for an important and increasing part of the dynamics of the net foreign 
asset positions of countries. For the U.S., valuation effects have tended to be positive and economically 
large.” 
3 Since the dollar is the only reserve currency that has existed during the current period of financial 
integration, one contribution of this work is to add information about a new currency and an earlier 
historical period to the exorbitant privilege literature.  The period from 1914 to 1945 saw a decline in 




comparing the returns of identical securities paid in both the main international 
currency and other currency. The analysis of this type of security allows us to roughly 
isolate the component of the return differential associated with the distinct currencies.  
Two securities in the database possess this particular characteristic.  Both 
were bonds from American railroads (the Allegheny Valley Railroad Company and 
the Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati and Indianapolis Railway Company) 
payable either in gold/sterling or in dollars. The following excerpts were taken from 
the Stock Exchange Yearbook of 1869: 
“Allegheny Valley Railroad Company - The amount was $9,000,000 7%, 
currency bonds of $1,000 each; but to meet the natural dislike of this market to 
currency bonds, the Pennsylvania company, which guarantees both the principal and 
interest of these bonds, arranged that, at the option of the subscriber, both principal 
and interest should be paid in sterling, in which case, however, the interest was 
reduced to 6%. (…) The price of issue was 88%.” 
“Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati and Indianapolis Railway Company – 
The £500,000 consolidated mortgage bonds of £200 of this company, quoted in the 
official list, were issued in November, 1874, by Messrs. J. S. Morgan & Co. The price 
was £176 per bond. Interest is payable the 1st of June and December at the rate of 
6%, per annum in sterling, by the London agents, or at the rate of 7%, per annum in 
currency, by the company, at New York, at the option of the holder.” 
Both of these railroad bonds show clear and direct evidence of a “pure” 
exorbitant privilege: exactly the same asset paying two different yields when interest 




currency of payment, there are two securities identical in every respect except for the 
currency in which interest and principal were paid. Comparison of yields of the two 
bonds gives us a direct estimate of the pure exorbitant privilege Britain enjoyed (at 
the level of individual bonds). American borrowers paid a 100 basis point premium to 
borrow in dollars rather than sterling or gold.  
Securities that are payable simultaneously in two currencies, however, are 
rare. The usual solution is to calculate the average return on securities issued by one 
country (mostly denominated in the currency of that country) and compare it to the 
average return on similar securities issued by other countries. On average, British 
securities paid less 200 to 300 basis points in comparison to similar foreign securities. 
The next step of the analysis is to estimate the aggregate effect of pure 
exorbitant privilege: is the positive return differential strong enough to affect 
macroeconomic variables, such as those of the external accounts? If macroeconomic 
variables are affected, the country enjoys “aggregate” exorbitant privilege. To analyze 
aggregate exorbitant privilege, it is useful to introduce an intermediate concept: 
“weighted” exorbitant privilege. Both weighted and aggregate exorbitant privileges 
are derived from the definitions of external assets and liabilities. 
Countries usually interchange goods and services. Commercial relationships 
give birth to financial relationships. One example is a country that buys goods from 
Britain and has to pay in pounds sterling. In order to obtain sterling pounds, the 
country may accumulate sterling pounds from previous sales to Britain. The 
(decreasing) international reserves from the country are international assets for the 




borrow sterling pounds from a British bank. The amount lent will be part of Britain’s 
international assets as well as part of the international liabilities of the other country. 
In addition to financial relationships derived from commercial relationships, 
countries may engage in pure financial relationships. For example, a British investor 
buys a farm in Brazil. The farm represents an asset to the British investor and a 
liability to Brazil. It is usually the case that the external liabilities of the country that 
issues the main international currency are primarily denominated in the main 
international currency (US treasuries are denominated in dollars).4 Since its assets 
(the Brazilian farm) are denominated in currencies of other countries, the currency 
compositions of external assets and liabilities are different, with external assets 
mostly denominated in other currencies and external liabilities mostly denominated in 
the global reserve currency. Since pure exorbitant privilege implies that a security 
denominated in the global reserve currency pays a lower return than a similar security 
denominated in other currency, the portfolio composed of Britain’s external assets 
receives a higher return than the portfolio composed by British external liabilities.5  
“Weighted” exorbitant privilege is simply the calculation of a weighted 
average of securities’ returns, using as weights the shares of the securities in the 
overall external assets and liabilities, since different types of assets may enjoy 
different pure exorbitant privileges. If, as in the case of the US, external assets and 
                                                 
4 The stylized fact that the international liabilities of emerging markets are also denominated in the 
main international currency (and not in their national currencies) is called “original sin” in the 
literature. See Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2007) for a review. 
5 I am not arguing that the aggregate positive returns differential is caused by currency composition. I 
am simply stating that an aggregate positive return differential exists. Several factors, such as 





liabilities have similar magnitudes, the weighted average on returns is a good proxy to 
the revenues that the country receives from the rest of the world. For example, if a 
country that issues the global reserve currency has external assets and liabilities of 
100% of GDP and the weighted exorbitant privilege is 2% (the difference between 
the weighted returns on assets and weighted returns on liabilities is two percentage 
points), the country will receive 2% of GDP of revenues from the rest of the world. 
Different compositions of the asset or liability portfolios compound different returns, 
generating a stronger or weaker aggregate result. 
Aggregate exorbitant privilege depends on the composition of the country’s 
asset position (weighted exorbitant privilege), as well as on the absolute size of the 
country’s external positions. Large gross foreign asset and liabilities positions 
amplify the revenues generated by the security premium received by the country that 
issues the international currency.6 Rogoff and Tashiro (2015) argue that “To the 
extent a country (say the United States) does enjoy higher rates of return on foreign 
assets than it pays on comparable liabilities to foreigners, then it can earn a profit by 
‘‘grossing up’’ the size of its balance sheet in much the same manner that a hedge 
fund does.”  The final result of the “grossing up” is aggregate exorbitant privilege. In 
the example above, the issuer country received 2% of GDP, but if its external assets 
were 200% of GDP instead of 100%, the aggregate exorbitant privilege could jump to 
                                                 
6 The expression “security premium” is used interchangeably with “positive return differential”. While 
both refer to the difference in yields between securities quoted in the main international currency and 
securities quoted in other currencies, “security premium” implies that the difference in yields is related 
to the status of the main international currency as a tool to acquire the safe asset. The security premium 
concept is not related to seigniorage. It is useful to compare the country issuing the reserve currency to 
a monopolist that charges a mark-up for its output, in this case the safe asset. Since it faces a more 
elastic demand for its assets than other countries, the issuer of the global reserve currency is able to 




6% of GDP (using weighted returns on assets of 4% and weighted returns on 
liabilities of 2%). 
Another example elucidates how exorbitant privilege relates to the dynamics 
of the US external account in the late twentieth century. Consider a country with a 
current account deficit of 3% of GDP, gross external assets of 100% of GDP and 
external liabilities of 200% of GDP (which means that the country is a debtor with a 
net external position of -100% of GDP). If the capital gain on assets is 4.5% and the 
capital gain on liabilities is 0.5%, and if yields on assets are 1.6% and on liabilities 
0.3%, this country would still receive positive net resources from the rest of the world 
equal to 0.5% of GDP.  The positive return differential between assets and liabilities 
(pure exorbitant privilege) is large enough to outweigh the debtor position of the 
country. The return differential manifests itself as an aggregate exorbitant privilege 
and it interferes with the dynamics of the external accounts since it means that this 
country accumulates less external liabilities than in the absence of the phenomenon.  
Periods of high financial integration such as 1870-1914 and the last quarter of 
the twentieth century are characterized by the ease of performing commercial and 
financial transactions between countries. The greater the number of financial 
transactions between countries, the larger the amounts of external assets and liabilities 
exchanged between countries and the size of exorbitant privilege to the issuer of the 
global reserve currency. 
Keynes (2004) described the level of financial (and commercial) integration of 




“The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea 
in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, 
and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same 
moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new 
enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in 
their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of 
his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in 
any continent that fancy or information might recommend.”  
The level of financial integration declined sharply after 1914 and would not be 
reached again until the second half of the twentieth century.  Britain was the core of 
the global economy from 1871 to 1914 and the pound sterling was the main 
international currency. London was the financial center of the world and the main 
channel through which British exported capital (an average of 5% of GDP annually). 
Estimates of the net external position of Britain before the First World War are 
controversial, but fall in a range between 120% and 160% of GDP.7   
Why is the separation between pure and aggregate exorbitant privilege 
necessary? To apply the analysis of the recent US literature to Britain, it is necessary 
to disentangle both concepts. Since Britain’s current account was not in deficit for 
most years, the pure exorbitant privilege manifested itself in the export of capital. I do 
not explain the origin of pure exorbitant privilege. Rather, I take it as a historical fact 
                                                 
7 A large literature devoted to the question of the long-term impact on growth of the export of capital 
asks if British investors acted rationally by sending capital abroad instead of investing in domestic 
industries. This issue is not discussed in detail here. Important references are McCloskey (1970), 




to be documented, but want to measure the existence of the aggregate counterpart, a 
replication of the literature for the US. 
The standard practice in the existing literature is to assess the existence of an 
aggregate exorbitant privilege with respect to GDP as an empirical measure. I require 
a measure of the total returns on the British portfolio to perform such a calculation. 
Because aggregate data is not available for pre-1914 Britain, I use a dataset based in 
individual assets. The lack of aggregate data, however, is a blessing rather than a 
curse. The flaws that plague the existing exorbitant privilege literature stem from the 
use of incompatible sets of aggregate data. By building estimates of external positions 
from underlying microdata on flows, prices, and yields of securities, I avoid these 
flaws.  Another advantage of using historical data is that it describes a less complex 
financial period than the last quarter of the twentieth century and allows the 
calculation of aggregate variables without the large resources available to modern 
official statistical agencies.  The data presented here has been used in the economic 
history literature on the British export of capital, but I apply it in a novel way to 
estimate the net external asset position of Britain.8  
A simple model of external budget constraint accounting 
The discussion of exorbitant privilege is filled with different concepts and 
definitions. Since the literature evolved from the analysis of a specific case (the US), 
most of its conclusions are entangled with idiosyncratic American characteristics. I 
need a simple formal representation of variables at issue to compare in a clear way 
                                                 
8 Since this new version of the data is a useful resource to the field of international finance, I include an 
explanation of historical sources and discuss the methods used to produce estimates of British external 




the estimates made for the US with the ones I construct for Britain. I need to 
distinguish between price variables (capital gains and yields) and stock variables (the 
international assets and liabilities of countries) to disentangle pure and aggregate 
exorbitant privilege. Simple definitions derived within the accounting framework 
encapsulate both concepts. 
The general accounting framework for the net foreign asset position is based 
on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Habib (2010). The net foreign position of a 
country for period t can be written as	 =  − , where 	denotes the stock of 
gross external assets and  the stock of gross external liabilities. The change in the 
net foreign position can be decomposed into its main determinants: 
Equation 1 
 − 	
 =  +  
The change in the net foreign position is equal to the current account balance 
() plus , the capital gain or loss.9 The valuation component  is the key to 
transforming the underlying flows CA into changes in stocks ( − 	
). It 
can be defined as the result of changes in asset prices () and exchange rates () at 
which assets and liabilities are valued at the end of each period: 
                                                 
9 The fundamental identity of balance of payments accounting is  +  = 0. As explained in the 
previous section, the origin of international investment positions are the flows of the financial account 
(FA). The capital account (a small item in the balance of payments encompassing capital transfers) and 
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 and  represent the ! securities that compose gross external assets and " 
securities that compose gross external liabilities.10 An example of the equation above 
is an American investor that buys a Brazilian stock for 100 dollars in January. If that 
stock is trading at 120 dollars in February, the investor had a capital gain of 20%. If 
the stock is trading at 80, the investor had a capital loss of 20%. If the stock is trading 
at 120 in February, but the investor bought the stock in January at an exchange rate of 
1 dollar to 1 Brazilian real and in February the exchange rate depreciates to 1 dollar to 
2 Brazilian reais (the plural of real in Portuguese), the investor had a capital loss of 
40% (gains of 20% originating from price variation and losses of 50% originating 
from the exchange rate movement).  
The current account  equals the sum of the balance on goods, services and 
current transfers (#$%) and the investment income balance	&# =	 !	
 − ! 	
, 
                                                 
10 
This procedure of price updating is called mark-to-market. This is a standard procedure for the 
calculation of a country’s international investment position, as formally described in the International 
Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Manual (BPM). Version 6 of the BPM states: “Positions of 
financial assets and liabilities should, in general, be valued as if they were acquired in market 
transactions on the balance sheet reporting date. Many financial assets are traded in markets on a 
regular basis and therefore can be valued by directly using the price quotations from these markets”. 
This message is even clearer in the previous version of the Manual: “In principle, all asset and liability 
stocks comprising a country's international investment position should be measured at market prices. 
This concept assumes that such stocks are continuously (regularly) revalued---for example, by 
reference to actual market prices for financial assets such as shares and bonds or, in the case of direct 




where ! and ! 	are the nominal yields on assets and liabilities. 11 Denoting ratios to 
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where . is the growth rate of nominal GDP.  
One potential consequence of pure exorbitant privilege is that  >  .12 
Since there is a positive return differential between securities quoted in the main 
international currency and securities quoted in other currencies, this condition must 
also hold in average or aggregated terms.  Yields on investments (!, ! ) are also a 
component of equation 3. Depending on the type of asset, the positive spread between 
returns on assets and liabilities can occur in dividends, coupon payments or earnings 
on direct investment that can be incorporated in the equation as 	 + ! >  +
! . Differently from capital gains represented by kg, yields are periodical flows and 
only affect external liabilities and assets to the extent that they are reinvested.   
Two definitions of aggregate exorbitant privilege are common in the 
literature.13 The first is that the US income balance of the current account is positive 
                                                 
11 The component compensation of employees that is usually included in the income balance is small if 
compared to investment income. It can be included instead in BGST. 
12 This is weighted exorbitant privilege, since pure exorbitant privilege applies to individual assets.   >   is a weighted average of pure exorbitant privileges, according to equation 2. 
13 See the description of Gourinchas and Rey (2007) in the next section. McCauley (2015) explains 
several concepts of exorbitant privilege, including seigniorage. The discussion that follows relates 
directly to his concept (4), although is also linked to his concepts (1) and (3). A usually neglected topic 
contained in the discussion is the role of adverse selection when foreign firms acquire American assets: 
“Cross-border acquisitions in the competitive US market for corporate control do not get the pick of 




despite the country being an international debtor since 1988. This holds if  
(	
 	
⁄ ) > 1 and ! > ! (	
 	
)⁄ . The second is that there is a significant 
positive difference between the constructed net asset position and the cumulated 
current account series. By solving equation 1 backward for past values of  and 
assuming that 3 = 0, the result is   = ∑ 53 + ∑ 53 . If  >
∑ 53 , then ∑ 53 > 0.14  
By requiring that ()* − ()*	
 > +,-, or that in each period the variation 
in the net foreign asset position is greater than the flows of good, services and 
transfers, I reach a definition of aggregate exorbitant privilege encompassing most of 
the definitions stated before: 
Equation 4 
( + ! − .) > ( + ! − .) (	
 	
)⁄ 	 
This equation might be complemented by +,- < 0. In the case of the US in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century and the UK in the period 1871-1914, #$% is 
negative. In both cases, the relation !	
 > ! 	
 holds, and in the case of Britain 
!	
 > ! 	
 − #$%.15  None of the expressions depends directly on the sign of 
 − , but some expressions are function of the ratio	/. This means that exorbitant 
privilege can occur in a country with a positive net external position (( )⁄ < 1) as 
                                                 
14 Since the first definition of the literature states that &# > 0, this condition can also be rewritten as  > ∑ #$%53 . Gourinchas and Rey (2007) state the second definition in terms of GDP. The 
correct procedure would be to use equation 3 to get ()* > ∑ (+,- (1 + .)	⁄53 ). Since their paper 
is mostly based on graphical analysis, it seems possible that they used instead ()* > ∑ ( ')⁄53 . 
Despite being the first work to use the expression “exorbitant privilege”, it provides no formal 
definition. Their introduction contains a vague explanation: “For some, it refers to the fact that the 
US’s income balance has remained positive all these years, despite mounting net liabilities. For others 
(…) exorbitant privilege referred to the ability of the US to run large direct investment surpluses, 
ultimately financed by the issuance of dollars held sometimes involuntarily by foreign central banks.”  
15 Since 1876, the trade balance was mostly in deficit, while the current account remained in positive 




in Britain. In the case of the US, liabilities are greater than assets (/ > 1). 
The literature has used the concepts above with the objective of finding a 
characteristic that could single out the issuer of the global reserve currency. Habib 
(2010) plots net external positions, cumulated #$%, cumulated investment income 
balance (!	
 − ! 	
) and cumulated  for six countries from 1980 to 2007. He 
finds that the US is the only country that presents a consistent pattern of positive  
and investment income balance. Australia, Argentina and Brazil have negative 
investment income balances, while Germany and Japan (surplus countries) have 
negative capital gains. Gourinchas and Rey (2014) find that for the period 1970 to 
2010, Germany, Japan, Russia, India and China present negative capital gains, while 
the figure is mixed for Brazil and UK. 
The concepts presented in this section will permeate the discussions of this 
work. In chapters 4 and 5, most of the analysis of pure and aggregate exorbitant 
privilege follows the literature and relates to the conditions  + ! >  + !  and 
the condition from equation 4. These conditions constitute intuitive criteria for 
exorbitant privilege, not a decomposition of the causes of the phenomenon. The paper 
by Rogoff and Tashiro (2015) contains an important qualification to the last point: 
“The broader definition, of course, confounds many different phenomena, not 
all of which can necessarily be thought of as “privilege”.16 If a US company builds an 
auto plant in a risky and unstable emerging market, a high return might be regarded as 
compensation for taking a greater risk than a foreign company that invests in the US 
                                                 
16 They adopt two definitions of exorbitant privilege. While the narrowest definition includes only 
securities issued by the government of the country that issued the main international currency, the 





International Finance Literature 
All the existing references of the international finance literature use aggregate 
data to build estimates of net external positions and exorbitant privilege. The reason 
for the use of aggregate data is the unavailability and complexity of the underlying 
microdata. One example of how the use of aggregate data can be problematic is 
related to the price-updating of previous stocks of investments (as explained in the 
definition of  in the previous section) by general price indexes. American equity 
investment in Brazil is heavily concentrated in commodities companies. If the 
Brazilian stock index is instead concentrated in telecommunications companies, and 
the prices of stocks of telecommunications companies increased less than those of 
commodities companies, a measure of capital gains for American equity investment 
in Brazil based on the overall Brazilian stock index would underestimate the true 
figure. 
Meissner and Taylor (2008) is the only previous discussion of exorbitant 
privilege for Britain from 1870 to 1914. Their paper draws lessons from history with 
respect to the future dynamics of the financing of the US current account deficit. 
According to their work, Britain realized a diminishing privilege over the pre-war 
period. They estimate returns by regressing the income account on the net external 
position of Britain. Since there are no official figures for the British net external 
position during this period, they use an estimate from Imlah (1958) originally backed 
out from the income accounts, which corresponds to the stock of assets that results in 




and Taylor’s estimated rate of return must equal Imlah’s chosen rate of return, as the 
authors acknowledge. In the end, the authors rely primarily on prior evidence from 
the literature on returns, specifically Davis and Huttenback (1986).17 
The first attempt to estimate the net external position in the United States (and 
other countries) for recent years was Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), followed by 
revisions and extensions in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). They tackle the lack of 
data on external assets and liabilities by constructing estimates of  since 1970 
based on aggregate country data. They estimate the initial stock value of the 
components of the balance of payments as of 1970 and accumulate flows from there 
(going backwards or going forward), adjusting for prices. The price adjustment term 
() is estimated at the aggregate level using generic measures of prices. In their 
original paper, for example, equity assets are adjusted by the Morgan Stanley Capital 
Index and equity liabilities by national stock market indexes. They assume that equity 
external asset positions of all countries are the same and that the portfolio of external 
liabilities is the same as the composition of national stock market indexes. Their 
original paper also adjusts for the composition of external assets and liabilities in 
terms of currencies. Their second paper uses additional data (such as the IMF’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey) to improve and extend the original 
estimates, but relies on the same methodology.   
Gourinchas and Rey (2007, hereafter GR) examine the US case more closely. 
Gross external asset and liability series are constructed by updating aggregate data 
with generic indexes of prices and exchange rates, using aggregate data for each class 
                                                 




of investment such as equity, debt, direct investment and other.  Their main objective 
is to highlight the role of the US as a leveraged financial intermediary (short in short-
term and fixed-income securities and long in external equity and direct investment) at 
the center of the international financial system. Related to this special position, GR 
define exorbitant privilege through the two puzzles mentioned above (a positive US 
income balance despite the country being an international debtor and the positive 
difference between the constructed net asset position and the cumulated current 
account series). The first is the “income puzzle” and the second the “position puzzle”. 
GR also present a useful decomposition of excess returns (returns on assets 
minus returns on liabilities) into two channels when explaining what is unique about 
the US external position. Defining  9 = ! +  as total returns for  ! = (, )	and 
αj and λj as the weights of each investment class j (equity, debt, direct investment and 
other) in total assets and liabilities, the difference in total returns may be directly 
decomposed as: 
Equation 5 
9 − 9 =  :; + <=2 :9 − 9 = + :; − <=
(9 + 9 )2  
The first term on the right-hand side is the total return effect. It refers to the 
fact that the US usually receives a higher return on its assets than it pays on its 
liabilities for each class of assets. For this channel, since only returns are being 
compared, the portfolio positions of assets and liabilities are not relevant. This is the 
most important channel explaining the advantageous external position for the US. 
The second term on the right-hand side is called the composition effect. The 




risk (and return). In contrast, debt, bank loans and trade credit dominate the US 
foreign liabilities. These different compositions are compounded by the currency 
composition of assets and liabilities. Given the returns on individual asset classes, the 
different compositions of assets and liabilities generate different aggregate returns. 
For the period 1973-2004, the excess return received by the US was 3.3%, with 2.4% 
coming from the return effect and 0.9% from the composition effect. 
The most recent contribution to the core of the exorbitant privilege literature is 
Curcuru, Thomas and Warnock (2013, henceforth CTW). 18 They show that 
differences among various estimates (from GR and the following literature) for the 
excess returns in the US come from the use of different databases that are 
inconsistent. Specifically, existing estimates of  in equation 1 are calculated based 
on the existing series of  and , but the 	statistics contain a residual term 
? (other changes) that is possibly related to missing flows. The inclusion of this 
term in the calculation generates biased estimates of excess returns.19 CTW argue that 
                                                 
18 Other previous references are the subsequent work of Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) and 
Habib (2010). In the first paper, the time coverage of the original database was extended to include the 
recent crisis period. The US transferred wealth to the rest of world during the crisis, which is the 
expected offsetting duty from the benefit received during tranquil times. Habib (2010) compares the 
US to 48 other countries for the period 1981-2007. He concludes that indeed the US exhibits exorbitant 
capital gains when compared to other countries, and confirms the importance of the return effect. More 
recently, Rogoff and Tashiro (2015) analyze the case of modern Japan and conclude that the world’s 
largest creditor (for many years) and second largest market economy also enjoys exorbitant privilege. 
The case of Japan is particularly suitable to be compared to Britain, since both countries maintained 
current account surpluses and positive net external position.  A precursor of the exorbitant literature 
with the name “dark matter” is Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). 
19 According to CTW, NFA and CA, “which have completely different revisions policies and come 
from different data collection systems, are not consistent with one another.” and “discrepancies in 
estimates of returns differentials owed in large part to past BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
policies of regularly revising positions, rarely revising flows, and never publicly releasing revisions to 
valuation adjustments.” CTW also quote statisticians of the BEA: “’Other changes’ are changes in 
position that cannot be attributed to price changes, exchange rate changes, or financial flows... it is 
unlikely that significant price or exchange rate changes have been erroneously included in “other 
changes”... it is far more likely that financial flows that could not be identified from revisions to 




a more accurate estimate of the excess return for the period 1990-2011 is 1.8%, but 
the value varies considerably with the chosen time interval.  Their estimates for the 
two channels are:  
- Composition effect. Measurement of the composition effect is not 
controversial, since the difference in composition between US external assets 
and liabilities is clear, but its contribution to the returns differential is smaller 
than previously estimated. Their estimate for the period 1990-2011 is only 
0.1%.20  
- Return effect. Using corrected data, the total return differential is smaller than 
previously estimated. Capital gains are only 1.6% for assets and 1.2% for 
liabilities over the period 1990-2011. The yield differential (! − ! ) is 
responsible for the major part (1.4%) of the total return differential. 
The direct consequences for the two puzzles are:  
- The income puzzle is driven exclusively by yields on direct investment.  
Differences on returns on direct investment between US assets and liabilities 
are high for several reasons. Of the total direct investment earnings 
differential of 5.6%, the authors estimate that at least 2.4% comes from 
genuine reasons, such as direct investment assets being riskier and more 
mature than direct investment liabilities. On the other hand, at least 1.8% 
comes from a technical illusion created by the accounting of direct investment 
assets before tax and liabilities after tax.  
                                                 
20 The sample period is an important source of variation of estimates, as GR (2014) indicate. 
Nonetheless, since the net external position of the US was more negative in the nineties than in the 
seventies, the comparison between the two results is still possible, which means that CWT would find 




- Position puzzle. Since CTW’s estimate of differences in capital gains is 
smaller than previous estimates, the explanation for the difference between net 
external assets and the cumulated current account must reside somewhere 
else. CTW find that valuation adjustments (updated to solve the compatibility 
problems between balance of payments and international investment position 
statistics) still explain the greatest part of the gap. They also correct for 
statistical discrepancies between the current and financial accounts. In theory 
 +  = 0, but in practice measurement errors and omissions mean that 
an error term @ exists ( +  + @ = 0). Since the origin of international 
investment positions are the flows of the financial account (FA), using CA as a 
proxy for FA is acceptable as long E is small.  
The most important contribution of CTW is to assimilate work done by 
statisticians from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the official compilers of 
the American data used in previous papers. Using aggregate data to estimate different 
macro phenomena can be perilous, since the original data may not be suitable for that 
purpose. Since the calculations of aggregate variables are marked by extreme and 
increasing complexity, the only group capable of accessing the underlying (and large) 
data and knowledgeable enough to treat and adapt it is the one that produced those 
statistics in the first place.  
Table 1 merges table 3 from GR (2014) and tables 1, 2 and 3 from CTW 
(2013). The range for estimates for differences in total returns (capital gains plus 
yields) is wide, going from 0.6 to 6.9, depending on the specification of error terms 




data utilized by the majority of authors is not suitable to answer the questions of 
interest. For example, the estimates from GR (2014) for the period 1973-2011 range 
from 2% if OC is allocated as missing flows to 3.8% if OC is allocated as valuation. 
GR (2014) also compile their estimate for the US valuation component as a share of 
GDP, ranging from 0.84% for the period 1971 – 1980 to 4.75% of GDP for the period 
2001 - 2010. 
The estimates presented for the US in Table 1 and the previous paragraph 
provide the main basis of comparison to the results obtained to Britain in the period 
1870-1914. The estimates presented for the US utilize aggregate data and are rough 
approximations for the return differential, an important caveat, while my estimates for 
Britain are more precise, since they are built from microdata. I discuss the procedures 















Source Period Difference in Returns 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) 1983-2003 3.1 
GR (2007) 1973-2004 3.3 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 1995-2004 2.7 
Meissner and Taylor (2008) 1981-2003 3.7 
CTW (2008) 1990-2007 1.1 
Curcuru, Dvorak, et al. (2008) 1994-2005 0.72 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) 1983-2007 0.6 
Forbes (2010) 2002-2006 4.6 - 6.9 
Habib (2010) 1981-2007 3.4 
Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) 1973-2009 1.6 – 3.5 
CTW (2013) 1990-2011 1.9 
GR (2014) 1973-2011 2 – 3.8 
Gohrband and Howell (2015) 1990-2005 1.7 
 
Table 1: Returns differential estimates from the international finance literature. Main 





Chapter 2: Procedure 
This chapter delineates the procedure I use to calculate the British external 
position and the revenues originating from it. The calculation of revenues is the main 
component of the estimation of aggregate exorbitant privilege presented in the next 
chapter.  Description of the procedure is followed by a discussion of its limitations. 
Two sections contain a discussion of the role of pound sterling under the gold 
standard and a presentation of evidence from the financial history literature on the 
existence of pure exorbitant privilege, a necessary condition for the existence of 
aggregate exorbitant privilege.21   
Background on the nineteenth century: The Gold Standard 
In the nineteenth century, the international monetary system was the gold 
standard. Under this system, countries fixed the prices of their domestic currencies in 
terms of a specified amount of gold, which meant that exchange rates were fixed. 
Since gold was the core of the system, a question immediately arises: Was the actual 
reserve currency in the late nineteenth century gold, with the pound sterling only 
being a close substitute? In that case, gold would benefit from the extra demand 
generated by its status as the global reserve asset, affecting positively the price of the 
                                                 
21 This work will not analyze an important difference between the US and UK, the existence of 
colonies. Because of the inherent condition of colonies, the metropolis derives extraordinary income 
from direct political control. The literature on Imperialism (the economics of empire) is extensive. 
Foreman-Peck (1989) does not find evidence of extraordinary income from India, the most important 
British colony after American independence. Davis and Huttenback (1986), in their definitive work, 
conclude that colonies did not represent an outrageous source of net revenues to Britain. In conclusion, 
the return differential with respect to colonies was not significantly different from what the British 




metal.22 Gold producers would enjoy this valuation effect, meaning that Britain and 
the pound sterling per se would not enjoy an exorbitant privilege. A summary of the 
history and the mechanism of the gold standard clarifies this question and explains 
the role of the pound as a reserve currency independent from gold.23  
Britain officially ended the monetary role of silver in 1821. By the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century most other European countries had converted to the gold 
standard. The US first entered the system in 1834 and abandoned it in 1933. The Civil 
War caused the suspension of the gold parity and the issuance of greenbacks between 
1862 and 1879. The US returned to the gold standard de facto in 1879. Formal 
legislative recognition did not come until 1900, and in the interim there was a 
constant threat that silver might be included in the US monetary base. Britain 
abandoned the gold standard in 1931 after a suspension between 1914 and 1925. 
The first classical description of the gold standard was Hume (1752). While 
on the gold standard, central banks (or monetary authorities) issued only currency 
backed by gold. In order to buy goods from another country, a person would convert 
their national currency into gold to pay the foreign seller. The seller would return to 
his country and convert the gold into his national currency. In this sense, there was a 
direct link between the balance of payments of the country and the monetary base. A 
country that was importing more than exporting had to send gold abroad to pay for 
                                                 
22 The safety aspect is natural, since gold is a metal with intrinsic value. The pound sterling would be 
safe only to the extent of its interchangeability with gold, in which case sterling would be an ersatz 
reserve currency. 




the deficit. Because of gold outflows, the monetary base shrank and the price level 
fell, making the local products cheaper and automatically closing the external gap.24 
This description is very simplified and tied entirely to trade flows. The 
inclusion of financial markets adds complexity. Exporters and importers used bills of 
exchange to finance the movement of goods. The exporter received a bill of exchange 
from the buyer and discounted it at the local bank. The bank would send this bill 
through a network of banks to the buyer's bank in a foreign country. There, the buyer 
would accept the bill and pay for it. Banks would sell and buy bills of exchange going 
in both directions, reducing the necessity of sending gold physically. Gold was 
shipped to cover net flows, not gross flows and only for persistent imbalances over 
time. Bills of exchange were denominated in the currency of the largest financial 
houses of the time, located in Britain. Other financial flows were also important. 
Besides bills of exchange, investors could buy bonds, equities, and insurance. For 
example, British investors bought assets such as American land and securities, and 
arbitraged the market price of gold and the official rate in different locations.25  
The actual usage of gold varied in two other dimensions:  
1. In a small group of core countries (Britain, France, Germany and the US) gold 
coins constituted a large part of money in circulation. In most other cases (the 
                                                 
24 A technical detail is the fact that gold had a dual role as a monetary conduit and as a commodity. 
Jones and Obstfeld (2004) distinguish between monetary and non-monetary gold flows. Gold traded as 
a commodity is a current account transaction, but, if exchanged for monetary purposes, it is a capital 
(or financial) flow. 
25 Another departure from the classical framework is that central banks could speed up or slow down 
the adjustment process. By changing the discount rate at which they discounted bills of private banks, 
the monetary authorities managed credit and price levels without triggering gold movements. This 
policy was referred to as the rules of the game. One important qualification is that those open market 
operations were only feasible in countries with liquid markets.  Not surprisingly, the most powerful 




periphery), a large share of the money supply circulated in the form of paper 
and other materials. These countries were on the gold standard because their 
central banks or equivalent institutions stood ready to convert money into gold 
at a fixed price.  
2. Countries also held different compositions of international reserves. While the 
core countries maintained primarily gold as international reserves, others kept 
their international reserves in the form of currencies of countries that were 
convertible in gold and had strong credibility. Countries such as India, Japan 
and Russia earned a positive yield on their reserves by keeping them in the 
form of British Treasury bills or bank deposits in London.  
Table 2 shows that sterling-denominated assets were the preferred asset of 
official institutions when excluding gold.26 
Year Gold Sterling Francs Marks Other Total Non-Gold 
1899 - 105.1 27.2 24.2 9.4 246.6 
1913 4846.2 425.4 275.1 136.9 55.3 1124.7 
 
Table 2: Assets Holdings of Governments and Central Banks (USD Millions). The 
residual between total non-gold and the sum of currencies is unknown allocation. 
Source: Lindert (1969). 
                                                 
26The figures from Lindert (1969) show that official (central banks and governments) foreign exchange 
reserves amounted to 22% of official gold reserves in 1913 (when excluding Britain, which held the 
largest official gold reserves after the US. For obvious reasons, pounds sterling were not held as 
international reserves by Britain). This figure is almost surely underestimated since the author lacks 
data for foreign exchange reserves for many countries. The author does not have estimates for gold 




The gold standard was a fixed exchange rate regime, with the direct 
consequence that valuation effects coming from exchange rate dynamics were 
minimal. From 1879 (after the greenback period in the US) to 1914, the annual 
average of the most important exchange rate at the time (US dollar to pound sterling, 
also known as “the cable”) was very close to the official rate of 4.85 dollars per 
pound sterling with an annual standard deviation of only 2 cents (see Figure 1). Some 
countries offered additional safety for British investors. In Brazil, a government 
profit-guarantee system abolished exchange rate risk for foreign investors, as 
explained by Abreu (2000). Although there was no government guarantee in the 
United States, investors in American companies were able to obtain similar 
guarantees against exchange rate risk, during the period when coinage of silver was 
under discussion, by purchasing securities denominated in pounds sterling. Because 
of those factors the capital gains arising from exchange rate variation are small in the 





Figure 1: The exchange rate between US dollars and UK pounds sterling (dollars per 
one pound sterling).  
While gold was the core of the monetary system of the nineteenth century, a 
large superstructure of financial arrangements and transactions surrounded it. 
Britain's central position in global finance, trade and industry meant that the British 
financial markets were the most liquid and sophisticated in the world. The direct 
consequence was that British assets and the pound sterling assumed a major 
independent role in the international financial system. Instruments denominated in 
pound sterling composed the international financial superstructure. While gold was a 
settlement currency, the pound sterling was the global reserve currency. The fact that 
the majority of financial assets were denominated in pounds and that countries held 
international reserves in the form of pounds meant that the pound enjoyed an 
exorbitant privilege even in the presence of gold. Those additional sources of demand 
increased the liquidity and safety premium of sterling denominated assets and 



























The complementarity between financial flows (in the form of infrastructure 
lending) and the predominance of Britain in capital goods exports further 
strengthened the special position of the pound sterling. All these factors contributed 
to create a unique environment of advantageous financing conditions to British 
investors. British investors responded to this advantage by exporting capital and this 
enhanced the initial favorable sterling position even further.   
Previous studies on returns 
Several studies have analyzed the returns on British investment in the 
nineteenth century to determine whether British investors were acting rationally when 
they invested resources abroad rather than at home. The export of British capital is 
one of the main characteristics of capital flows in the nineteenth century. This branch 
of the economic history literature has already generated estimates of return 
differentials.  
Table 3 contains a summary of estimated return differentials in the literature 
(explained below), with each reference containing different samples of coverage and 
classes of securities. The exact numbers differ across authors but two patterns are 
clear. Equity returns are higher than debt returns. More importantly, British assets 
paid a lower return (capital gain plus yield) than comparable assets from other 
countries for each class of asset (with one exception). In the particular case of 
government bonds, Chabot and Kurz (2010) find that the return on foreign assets is 
twice that for UK bonds. Assets from the United States seem to yield a higher return 
than average. Looking at the last column of the table, the same is true for France (note 




evidence that Britain benefited from a pure exorbitant privilege. 
 
Table 3: Survey on the literature on returns of financial securities for 1866 – 1913 
(FR means France). 
Curiously, even though this literature has used information on prices of British 
assets and flows of investments originating from Britain, no one has gone a step 
further and connected these two series to build an international investment position.   
Edelstein (1982) collected data on returns and used portfolio optimization 
techniques to conclude that British investors received a higher return from overseas 
investments than domestic ones. Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) argued that British 
investors were aware of the benefits of diversification even if they lacked a formal 
theory. Using modern portfolio theory, they conclude that foreign debt and equity 
presented a high return when compared to their domestic counterparts. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of foreign assets in the British portfolio improved the risk-return 
characteristics of the portfolio frontier. One of the interesting conclusions of their 
paper is that British investors would have benefited from investment overseas 




domestic returns. In most cases, if short sales were allowed, the authors found that 
rational investors should have shorted UK debt (generally defined) to invest in 
foreign assets. 
Chabot and Kurz (2010) apply the same techniques to an expanded monthly 
database collected from several sources.27 Their new database includes 2242 stocks 
and 1817 bonds negotiated in London or the US. They also find that foreign asset 
returns dominated domestic returns. Given the imperfect correlation between 
domestic and foreign assets, the inclusion of foreign assets expanded the mean-
variance frontier. This is further confirmed by tests showing that foreign assets were 
not spanned by domestic assets. The inclusion of foreign assets could increase the 
utility of a British investor by 10% to 89%, depending on parameters used in the 
utility function. Grossman (2015) uses Investor's Monthly Manual data to build 
several regional and sectoral equity indices for the London Stock Exchange between 
1869 and 1929. Finally, Edlinger, Merli and Parent (2013) add French data on 
portfolio allocations and find that the inclusion of more European securities made 
French allocations more balanced. This means that British investors should have 
included more European assets to achieve an optimal allocation, given the investment 
opportunities at the time.  
The general conclusion of the literature is that, from the point of view of 
modern capital flow theories, British investors lacked home bias and behaved 
according to neoclassical models by sending capital to where it obtained the highest 
return.   
                                                 
27
Money Market Review, Investor's Monthly Manual, The Economist, Commercial and Financial 




Procedure to build estimates of British external position and excess return 
The source of the new data presented in chapter 5 is the Investor’s Monthly 
Manual (IMM) from 1869 to 1914, a monthly publication providing information on 
all the securities traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the pre-WWI 
period, including stocks and bonds. For each security, the data set contains three 
groups of data that are relevant to calculate the international investment position: 
financial flows (), prices () and dividend yields (!).  FA and KG (calculated from 
 and ) are directly available from one consistent data source.  Rather than 
working back from aggregate data, estimates are built up from micro-data. Since 
prices and stock positions are available for each individual security, aggregation 
problems such as the previously mentioned example of commodities and 
telecommunications companies are absent: the same securities that compose the stock 
index compose the price index. 
The procedure ties together three separate steps: the calculation of aggregate 
capital flows, the estimates of net external positions (as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) and other sources, including the IMF and official compilers), and finally the 
calculation of aggregate exorbitant privilege. To understand how I generate data on 
external assets, consider the following example: 
- A British investor buys a security issued by a foreign firm on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). This represents a portfolio flow from Britain to the 
receiver country (). The flow gives birth to a liability from the receiver’s 
side and an asset from Britain’s side that constitutes a stock (in the sense of a 




that the stock of British investors’ holdings for each security is given by a 
proportion of the total (or nominal) stock of capital listed for that security at 
the LSE. 
- Once the stock of each security is determined, and given the issuance price for 
each security (3), it is possible to update the value of this stock by the stream 
of market prices ({}5
C ) for each month since the security was issued (or 
since the data is first available). As an example, if a security is issued at a 
price of 90 pounds and the price rises to 99 in the second month, the investor 
earns 10%, since in an organized market such as the LSE he could sell the 
security at the quoted price at any moment. These prices are used to measure 
the capital gains () or valuation effects.28 
- If the investor holds the security until maturity, he receives the security’s face 
value (or nominal value). In the example, the investor would receive 100 
pounds. This represents a reverse flow from the country that initially received 
the investment to Britain and reduces the stock of Britain’s external assets. 
- Depending on the type of security, the investor is entitled to receive periodic 
flows of money before the date of maturity. Those are the dividend or coupon 
                                                 
28 The issuance price is usually different from the security’s face value or nominal price. Since 
securities were usually quoted in terms of receivables of 100 pounds, in the example the security 
issuance price represents a discounted value with respect to the nominal face value. Some securities 
were sold at par value (or even at a premium over face value) and the capital gain was realized at the 
end of the life of the security, since the investor received a premium over face value (in this case the 
issuance price is the face value and the capital gain is given by the difference between “withdraw 
price” and the face value). With respect to debt securities, the coupon rate is an important component 
of the discussion, since the issuance price is related to the difference between the coupon rate offered 
by the security and the market rate. A discount of the issuance price relative to face value usually 
implies that the security’s coupon rate was below the initial market interest rate, since the capital gains 





yields (!), which affect the current account but do not directly affect the 
external asset position of Britain. An exception is dividends paid with new 
securities.  
- The total return is the combination of the capital gains and the dividend or 
coupon yield. 
- British external liabilities are calculated by using the stock of capital of British 
securities bought by foreign investors, following the same steps described 
above. 
After the aggregation of all securities, two series are constructed. The first is 
the sum of the capital value of each outstanding security for each period, measured at 
issuance prices. This is the issuance price series. The second is the sum of the capital 
value of each outstanding security for each period, measured at current market prices 
(updated by {}5
C ). The last series is a proxy for the British external position. The 
valuation component  is given by the difference between the issuance price series 
and the current market price series. The composition effect of Equation 5 can be 
assessed from the stock positions for each class of security while the return effect can 
be measured from the total returns given on assets and liabilities by price variations 
and dividend yields. The procedure builds up from microdata on individual financial 
securities. Another beneficial aspect is that the British external position is calculated 
directly from the financial flows FA, avoiding problems with respect to errors and 
omissions of the balance of payments and in line with the suggestions of Borio and 





Several qualifications are necessary. First, since the direction of the 
investment flow on the LSE is from Britain to other countries, it is clear that the data 
can be used only to construct an estimate of Britain’s external assets. The calculation 
of Britain’s external liabilities and exorbitant privilege requires knowledge of the 
stock of British securities held by foreigners, and my estimates rely on imputed 
values.29 I assume that foreigners held 20% of the nominal capital stock of British 
securities traded at the LSE, meaning that those securities belonged to UK external 
liabilities. British investors dominated the markets for British railroad and 
government securities during the period, but this assumption makes an allowance for 
foreign agents buying British assets on the London Stock Exchange. It is still possible 
to estimate the total return effect from the IMM data without additional assumptions, 
since prices and yields for British securities are available.  
Second, as already mentioned, foreign investors used the LSE to buy foreign-
issued securities. Assuming that the total capital for each foreign-issued security was 
bought exclusively by British investors would lead me to overstate British external 
assets.  A large literature addresses this issue in order to reach an overall figure for 
the stock of British assets on the eve of the First World War. The main challenge is 
that there is no record of the ownership of nominee holdings of bonds (the most 
popular security), due to the popularity in London before 1914 of “bearer” bonds 
                                                 
29 With regard to Britain's external liabilities, preliminary evidence indicates that they started growing 
after 1900 in connection to the financing of expenditures related to the Second Boer War, possibly by 
bonds or bank loans. While the government was borrowing from abroad, the country as a whole was 
still exporting capital. Data on British external liabilities may be available from counterparts. 
Examples are Abreu (2006) for Brazil, Stone (1977) for Latin America and Lewis (1975) and Wilkins 
(2009) for the US. Nonetheless, Meissner and Taylor (2008) boldly affirm, “British net external assets 




(payable simply to “bearer” without further specification). As for stocks, Davis and 
Huttenback (1986) (cited by Davis and Gallman (2001)) collect data from a random 
sample of corporations required to file equity structure statements, including 
addresses of stockholders. The sample contains 260 firms registered between 1883 
and 1907, 75 with their principal operations outside Britain, and 79,944 stockholders. 
They select reports made three to five years after registration to avoid capturing the 
original owners of the firms. The result is that 82.9% of the stockholders of foreign 
firms listed on the LSE were located in the UK (76.7% in England alone). For UK 
firms, the figure is 99.4% and the total average (including also the separate category 
Empire) is 89.5%. Of course, the total average can mask large variations between 
sectors, as pointed out by Kindersley (1929) for the period after the Great War 
(admittedly an event that constitutes a structural break). Platt mentions that “foreign 
government stock (sovereign bonds) was almost certainly held by foreigners to the 
extent of 30-40% before the First World War” and his overall estimate for securities 
held by foreigners is 15%. For this reason, I also make an allowance for foreign 
agents buying foreign assets at the LSE and assume that British investors held only 
80% of the nominal capital stock of foreign railroad securities and 60% of the 
nominal capital stock of foreign sovereign securities traded on the LSE.  
Third, it is also possible that British investors bought foreign-issued securities 
in stock exchanges outside Britain. Not taking this flow into account understates the 
British external asset position, which is the mirror of the previous problem.  As 
already mentioned, the LSE possessed a competitive and regulatory advantage with 




regulated by each government. Davis and Cull (2002) provide an extensive 
comparison between the LSE and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the 
time, and conclude that the NYSE’s institutional arrangements led companies seeking 
capital to the LSE. Finally, when comparing this problem with the one caused by 
foreigners buying securities in the LSE, Platt states that “British holdings on foreign 
exchanges fell far short of foreign holdings in London, and it is convenient but 
unrealistic to claim that they cancelled each other out.” 
This issue has an intertemporal aspect as well. Besides assuming that only 
British investors bought securities at the time of issue, my framework does not 
monitor changes in ownership after issue, if agents located inside Britain execute 
those changes. In this sense, if an American residing in London bought a security 
from a British citizen, the nominal stock series would not change. Of course, if the 
security moves from London to New York, a nominal stock decrease is expected, 
since some shares of the security would be delisted from London. This finding is 
particularly reassuring with respect to the previous literature on British investments 
overseas. Previous attempts to calculate the amount of British investments overseas 
on the eve of the First World War followed three strategies. The first was to calculate 
the level of investment by making assumptions about the return on investments and 
using the income account of the current account (Imlah (1958) is an example). The 
second used the residual of the current account.  The third and most influential, 
known as the Jenks-Simon series, used the “British Capital Created and Called” table 
from IMM to account for all new issues of capital in the LSE ( (Stone 1999) and 




attempt to calculate valuation effects, which means that there was no differentiation 
between flows and stocks. Furthermore, since the Jenks-Simon series focused on 
primary issues, it ignored developments in the secondary markets (and hence in the 
capital stock of the security), such as defaults, repatriations, sinking funds, reinvested 
earnings, redemptions and even the maturity of the issue.30 For example, a security 
issued in 1876 that matured after twenty years would still be included in the “stock” 
of British international investments on the eve of the First World War.31 My 
procedure accounts for all these changes, since they would affect the nominal stock of 
capital of the security. 
Summary of assumptions 
A summary of the main assumptions presented as well as others implicit in the 
text is presented below: 
                                                 
30 A sinking fund is a dedicated fund created by a company or government in order to buy back a 
certain security. There are several types of rules, including draws and auctions that could occur at 
market price (if the security was trading below par, for example) or at par. In some cases, a sinking 
fund is a mechanism for gradual amortization of the principal of a loan, avoiding a one-off large 
payment at the maturity of the instrument. The practical consequence is that the outstanding stock of a 
security decreases smoothly over time and this means a lower duration and higher price quotations. 
31 Another problem related to counting only new issues is the practice of underwriting, which was 
common in the years leading up to the First World War. A financial house, the underwriter, promised 
to take back the unsold part of the issue of a loan (subscription) in return for a commission. The unsold 
part of the loan varied and sometimes reached almost 100% of the issue. The underwriters who took 
back unsold securities could hold them until markets improved or sell at a deeper discount to investors 
(who sometimes behaved strategically by negotiating a lower price directly with the underwriter 
instead of buying the initial subscription). The direct consequence of not taking into consideration the 
underwriting of securities is that the stocks of assets and liabilities may be overestimated. The 
subsequent action of the underwriter in cases when it takes back a large percentage of the subscription 
matters. For a foreign asset, if a British underwriter keeps the securities or sells them later to British 
agents, it can still be considered British investment overseas. On the other hand, if the underwriter sells 
the securities to foreign agents the stock of British investment overseas would be overstated if the 
whole issue was counted. A modern indicator that addresses the issue of  underwriting is “free-float 
capitalization”, which excludes from the outstanding capital locked-in shares such as those owned by 




- The British external position is measured exclusively by portfolio 
investments.32 
- British investors’ holdings for each security are given by a proportion of the 
total capital listed for that security at the LSE. 33,34 In order to make an 
                                                 
32 Chapter 5 contains a discussion about direct investment. In future work, I will provide estimates of 
British direct investment in order to construct a more accurate measure of British external assets. The 
task of finding market prices for direct investment is notoriously difficult. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and CTW (2013) opt to use cumulated flows corrected for 
inflation (replacement cost) or exchange rate variation (book value). As already hinted above, for the 
majority of countries (with the exception of some industrial economies that publish international 
investment position statistics), the only viable alternative for measuring market prices of direct 
investment is to use stock market price indices, since the literature is based on aggregated figures 
coming from external accounts. A compendium of the reasons given in this literature for the 
inappropriateness of using stock market indexes follows:  1- It is highly doubtful that broad stock 
market indexes can approximate the returns of privately held corporations. 2 - The use of local stock 
market returns of tax havens, where much of US Direct Investment Abroad affiliates are located, is not 
appropriate. 3 - FDI liabilities in the form of greenfield investments bear little relation to the activities 
represented on the domestic stock market. 4- Some proportion of FDI is attributable to investment in 
residential and commercial properties. 5- The value of accumulated cash and liquid assets held by an 
affiliate (Treasury holdings included in FDI) will not have a direct relationship with the stock market. 
6 – Breakdowns of FDI between reinvested earnings and new direct investment flows are usually not 
available. Since prices for direct investment are usually not available even in the twentieth century, our 
future estimates on stocks of direct investment for the nineteenth century will be comparable to the 
figures of the twentieth century. The final class of investment present in the international investment 
position is other investments. There is evidence of large financial houses conceding loans related to 
sovereign debt restructuring and to trade credit. Estimates of these positions will also be provided in 
future versions. 
33 When a given security exhibited time variation for total capital (either because of expansion of 
capital or buyback), I assume that those operations were carried out using the market price. This leaves 
two important possible problems for the measurement of capital. The first concerns securities that were 
not fully paid at the time of issue. A company could issue a bond or a stock at a certain price but only 
demand that the investor pay upfront a percentage of the total price (for example 50%). At any time in 
the future, the shareholders could be called to pay the difference. It was an incipient mechanism of 
contingent capital. The upfront percentage was called “paid” or “par” value.  Without accurate 
information on paid value, the amount of capital is overestimated by counting the full value of capital 
when just a fraction was actually paid. Nonetheless, cases when the company did not call the full 
amount of capital within a few months after issuance were rare. The other problem is the existence of 
sinking funds (see footnote 30). Since there were several types of rules, including draws and auctions 
that could occur at market price (if the security traded below par for example) or at par, some securities 
may be taken off from the total capital not at the current market price but at face value. I will undertake 
a careful study of the paid values and sinking funds rules in the future in order to improve the quality 
of the estimate. 
34 For some US railway securities, the IMM lists the total value traded in UK and the US, instead of the 
value traded only in the UK. A comparison with Burdett’s Stock Exchange Intelligence for the year of 
1881 revealed that within a group of 48 American railway securities, 13 suffered from this problem 
(the total number of American railways securities was 123, but there was not enough information to 




allowance for foreign agents buying foreign securities at the LSE, I assume 
that British held only 80% of the nominal capital stock of foreign railroad 
securities and 60% of the nominal capital stock of foreign sovereign securities 
traded on the LSE. In the same vein, in order to make an allowance for foreign 
agents buying British securities at the LSE, I assume that only 80% of the 
nominal capital stock of British securities traded on the LSE was held by 
British. Those assumptions are on the extreme side of existing estimates in 
both cases.  By overestimating the share of foreign agents in possession of 
British and foreign assets traded at the LSE, I likely understate the UK net 
external assets position (and the net revenues coming from it).35  
- When coupon payments were not available for the calculation of yields, they 
were substituted for coupon rates. The use of coupon rates could overestimate 
yields when coupons were not paid, a rather frequent event. The substitution is 
also not applicable to dividend payments of equity securities, which do not 
contain coupon rates. 
The next chapter applies the procedure described above and reveals the main 
empirical findings of this work.   
                                                                                                                                           
only to equity, affirms that the same reporting problem exists for some French railways. This issue 
overstates British external asset position, since a proportion of the whole capital stock of the firm 
would be attributed to British investors, instead of a proportion of the exact amount effectively trading 
at the LSE. 
35 These assumptions will be refined in future versions of this paper that include the full sample of 
securities traded in the London Stock Exchange, with different weights for more granular classes of 




Chapter 3: Main Results 
The data sample contains securities from four sectors: foreign and British 
railroad securities and foreign and British sovereign securities.36 In total, 601,869 
observations are available for total capital and 571,402 for prices. Those observations 
correspond to 3,680 securities traded between January 1869 and July 1914, of which 
42 are British sovereign/government bonds, 1,202 are British railroads and 875 
foreign sovereign bonds. Government/sovereign securities were the main class of 
assets traded at the LSE and British government securities were the safe asset of the 
period.37 Railroads were the most important sector of private investment for the 
period. The US was the major destination for British foreign investments in railroads, 
but the sample includes countries from all continents, including Canada, Argentina, 
India, the Ottoman Empire and Brazil. Foreign sovereign securities and foreign 
railroad securities represented 68% of the total number of foreign securities traded at 
the LSE (Stone 1999). According to the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence for 1902 
(page 1898), the total capital of sovereign/government and railroad securities 
amounted to 88% of the total capital of all securities traded at the LSE. 
                                                 
36 British securities are those from England, Scotland and all of Ireland (Wales is part of England). 
37 Besides Exchequer bonds and bills, consols and war loans, the securities classified as government 
include debt from the Red Sea Telegraph Company, the Metropolitan Police and equity from the Bank 
of England and the Bank of Ireland. The last two securities were almost bonds, since they had fixed 
yields. Also originally included were sovereign bonds from other countries, such as Turkey and 
Transvaal that carried official guarantees from the British government. I opted to assign those last 
bonds to the countries that originally issued the securities for the sake of keeping a pure geographic 
breakdown of securities. Of course, when considered under the principle of ultimate borrower, those 




Table 4 summarizes the main characteristics of the data.38 In terms of total 
capital, foreign companies have a higher mean and standard deviation (due to 
sovereign securities – governments were able to issue more liabilities than private 
companies were). Average closing prices were higher than average issuance prices 
and face values (normalized to 100) for British securities, but below issuance prices 
and face values for foreign securities. The average coupon rate (contained in the name 
of the security) is 4.45% in the case of British securities and 4.90% in the case of 
foreign securities, with a larger standard deviation and a lower maximum value for 
foreign securities. Six dummy variables were created: Equity, Equity Preferred, 
Dollar Denominated, Pound Denominated, Sterling Clause and Gold Clause. On 
average, 30% of the securities are equity (which means that 70% are debt), and 14% 
are preferred shares (meaning that common stock is 47% of total equity). In the case 
of Britain, 50% of securities are equity and 28% of securities are preferred stock, 
while for the rest of the world these shares are 18% and 6%. These figures refer only 
to the number of securities and not capital values. While all British securities are 
quoted in pounds, 23% of foreign securities are quoted in dollars, but almost 14% of 
the total or 61% of those quoted in dollars contain a sterling or gold clause, which 
guarantees the payment in pounds or gold (abolishing exchange rate risk). 
                                                 
38 The table’s figures are in the original currency of the data. For example, “Capital Amount of Share” 
refers to the indivisible face value of one share or the capital amount divided by the number of shares. 
In the case of British securities, the maximum value of 200 represents 200 pounds, but in the case of 
foreign securities, the maximum value of 1000 possibly represents 1000 dollars, which is equivalent to 









Figure 2 maps the average shares of British capital invested in each country 
for the period 1869-1914 (total amount of British capital invested in the country for 
the period 1869-1914 over the total global amount of British capital invested offshore 
for the same period). The upper panel contains data for sovereign securities; the 
middle panel is dedicated to railroad securities and the lower panel to the total sum of 
the two sectors. The two sectors are distinct in terms of distribution of capital: while 
holdings of railroad securities were heavily concentrated in the US (with over 55% of 
the British investment in railroads), holdings of foreign sovereign securities were 
more equally distributed among several countries, led by Russia and France. The US 
only received between 1% and 5% of the British capital invested in sovereign 
securities. France, Argentina, Canada and India followed the US (with much smaller 
shares) as the most popular destinations for British investment in railroads. 
Combining railroad and sovereign securities, the most popular destinations overall for 
British capital were the US and France, followed by Russia and Spain.  
Figure 3 follows the same structure of Figure 2 and maps the growth of the 
stock of British investment by country between two periods: 1869-1875 and 1905-
1914.39 The middle panel shows that British capital investment in railroads fell over 
time in Asia and Europe in general and increased in the Americas, especially in 
Argentina, with growth over 100%, and also in Mexico, Colombia and the US. With 
respect to sovereign bonds, British investment grew by more than 100% in South 
                                                 
39 The growth rate is defined as the average of the British total capital received for each country and 
class of investment (sovereign/ railroad) over the period 1905-1914 divided by the average over the 
period 1869-1875. I chose this procedure instead of simply calculating the growth from the year 1869 
to the year of 1914 because many countries did not receive any investment in the year 1869 and they 




Africa and Japan (including the Korean peninsula), followed by Germany. The stock 
of British capital in sovereign securities fell in Spain, the Ottoman Empire, the US 
and several Latin American countries between the two periods.  
The heterogeneous distribution of resources and growth indicates that “pull” 
factors were important in explaining why British investors sent money abroad. In the 
case of railroads, the rapid expansion of the American rail network and companies 
during that period explains the position of the US as the top destination for British 
capital. By the end of the period, the expansion of American railways slowed, since 
tracks already covered most of the territory. On the eve of the First World War, 
British investors were allocating new investments to the expansion of railroads in 
Argentina in order to improve the transportation of agricultural and livestock exports. 
The growth of the stock of capital in German and Japanese sovereign bonds might be 
a result of the state-led industrialization processes occurring in those countries. Two 
factors might explain the growth of the British capital stock in South Africa: state 
investment in gold mines discovered around this period and investment related to the 
incorporation of the two Boer republics as colonies after the Boer Wars (it is also 
possible that the costs of the war were partly financed by bonds issued by the British 





Figure 2: Average Distribution of British Investment for the period 1869-1914 (total 
amount of British capital invested in the country for the period 1869-1914 over the 





























































British International Investment Position  
For each class of investment (sovereign / railroad) and geographical location 
(UK / foreign), I compute two series: 
1) Issuance price series: the sum of the capital value of each outstanding security 
for each month, measured at issuance prices. 
2) Market prices series: the sum of the capital value of each outstanding security 
for each month, measured at current market prices.  
Foreign securities compose UK’s external assets while British securities 
compose UK’s external liabilities. The cumulative capital gains on UK external assets 
and liabilities are given by the differences between the market price series and the 
issuance price series. 40 Market prices indicate the valuation of securities bought by a 
British investor at a specific moment in time. If an investor decided to sell that 
security at that moment in the market, he would receive a value that is different from 
the price at which he acquired the asset, which is the capital gain. Comparing market 
prices and issuance prices is analogous to a comparison of series constructed from 
cumulated current account balances (without valuation effects in the language of 
Gourinchas and Rey (2007)) and net external positions (calculated taking into account 
valuation effects). In this case, however, both estimates come from the same data 
                                                 
40 Dollar denominated securities (mostly from the US, Canada and some Latin America countries) 
were converted at the official exchange rate. From 1878 to 1914, I used the official exchange rate of 
4.86, based on the evidence in Figure 1. Before that, in the greenback period, the exchange rate was as 
high as 6.48 in 1869. Note that for most of the period, it was common practice in the London financial 
market to use the round value 4 shillings per dollar, which translates into 5 dollars per pound sterling. 
For the other currencies, I used the following exchange rates corresponding to one British pound 
sterling: 20.43 German marks, 26.28 Italian liras, 6.28 Russian rubles, 24.02 Austrian-Hungarian 
kroners, 12.10 Dutch guilders, 25.2 Spanish pesetas, 9.72 Japanese yens, 25.2 Belgian francs and 18.10 




source. Figure 4 shows the issuance and market price series for foreign railroad and 
government securities (panel A), and for British railroad and government securities 
(panel B).  The value of outstanding foreign railroad securities rises almost 
continuously from 1869 to 1914 in both series (issuance price and market price). 
Cumulative capital gains (the difference between the two series) are negative before 
1880 and positive between 1880 and 1900. Market value increases after 1900, 
meaning that capital gains are higher for the last years of the sample. For UK railroad 
securities, the market price series is above the issuance price series for the entire 
period before 1907. Cumulative capital gains increase almost continuously from 1869 
until around 1895 and decline thereafter, turning negative from 1907 to 1914. The 
value of outstanding foreign government bonds grows at a slower rate than foreign 
railroad securities, but the level of the former is higher than the level of the latter.41 
Cumulative capital gains are roughly stable for foreign sovereign securities after 
1885. UK government securities’ cumulative capital gains are smaller than for foreign 
sovereign bonds. They are mildly positive for a short period from 1895 to around 
1900 and then turn negative after 1900. The value of outstanding foreign securities is 
much higher than the value of outstanding British securities in both classes 
(railroads/sovereign).  
                                                 
41 The four “tumbles” in the series are probably due to misclassifications of the exchange rate of some 






Figure 4 Panel A: Value of outstanding foreign railroad and government securities 
(Millions of pounds sterling). Issue or issuance price series is the sum of the capital 
value of each outstanding security for each month, measured at issuance prices. 
Market prices series is the sum of the capital value of each outstanding security for 















































































Figure 4 Panel B: Value of outstanding British railroad and government 
securities (Millions of pounds sterling). Issue or issuance price series is the sum of the 
capital value of each outstanding security for each month, measured at issuance 
prices. Market prices series is the sum of the capital value of each outstanding 
security for each month, measured at current market prices. 
 
Figure 5 (panels A and B) scales the series presented in Figure 4 (panels A 











































































the outstanding value of foreign railroad securities traded at the LSE, 80% of the 
outstanding value of British railroad and government securities traded at the LSE (so 
that foreign investors owned 20% of British securities) and 60% of foreign 
government securities.42 The sum of the market price series for foreign government 
and railroad securities is a proxy for the total British external asset position while the 
sum of the market price series for British government and railroad securities is a 
proxy for the total British external liability position. The difference between the 
former and the latter constitutes a proxy for the British net external position. To my 
knowledge, this is the first monthly time series estimate of the British external 
position that takes into account capital gains and follows the modern methodology for 
the compilation of international investment positions.43 
The issuance price series for foreign railway holdings (already multiplied by 
0.8) oscillates between 60% and 80% of GDP from 1885 to 1914, after increasing 
from 35% to 60% of GDP between 1869 and 1885. The market price series has three 
distinct periods. In the first, between 1869 and 1885, it increases from 30% of GDP to 
80% of GDP, eventually overtaking the issuance price series in 1880. It then 
stabilizes at around 80% of GDP until 1905, when it moves to another level around 
                                                 
42 The nominal GDP series is taken from Dimsdale, Hills and Thomas (2015). The series includes the 
GDP for the whole island of Ireland. The formula for the top panel of figure 5 panel A is 0. 8 ∗(&,,F*(G	H9	I*9-	9!G,	$9!,	H)	H9!(	J*!K9H*L	$GF9!-!,) M⁄ , for the bottom panel 
of figure 5 panel A is 0.6 ∗ (&,,F*(G	H9	I*9-	9!G	$9!,	H)	H9!(	HO9(P(-	$GF9!-!,) M⁄ and for the 
two panels of figure 5 panel B is  0.2 ∗(&,,F*(G	H9	I*9-	9!G	$9!,	H)	#9!-!,ℎ	J*!K9H*L,	H9	HO9(P(-	$GF9!-!,) M⁄ . 
43 Previous estimates are in the range of 120% - 160% of GDP for total assets before First World War.  
Using the issuance prices (since the previous estimates did not take in consideration capital gains), I 
obtain a value around 160%. Multiplying 160% by 1.1 (since the sample represents around 90% of the 
total value of securities traded at the LSE), I obtain approximately 180%. Curiously, this figure does 




100% of GDP.  The sudden drop in July 1914 probably reflects the events that led to 
the First World War. 
The issuance and market price series for foreign government securities 
holdings rise from around 50% of GDP in 1869 to around 110% of GDP in 1885. 
Both series are stable from 1885 to 1914, with the issuance price series around 90% 
of GDP and the market price series around 110% of GDP. When scaled by the ratio 
of ownership of British assets, the capital gains on liabilities coming from UK railway 
securities in the years 1869-1910 are lower than the capital gains on foreign assets for 
most years. Capital gains on UK government securities are very low when compared 





Figure 5 Panel A: Measures of UK external assets (expressed as percentage of GDP 
and scaled by 80 percent for railroads and 60 percent for government securities). The 
formula for the top panel is 0.8*(Issuance or Market Prices Series of Foreign Railroad 
Securities) ⁄ GDP For the bottom panel is 0.6*(Issuance or Market Price Series of 



















































Figure 5 Panel B: Measures of UK external liabilities (expressed as percentage of 
GDP and scaled by 20 percent). The formula for the two panels is 0.2*(Issuance or 
Market Price Series of British Railroads or Government Securities) ⁄ GDP. 
Dividend yield estimates 
Dividend yields and coupon rates (!) are the other necessary component for 


















































dividend yields.44 I developed a specific procedure to organize the data for railroad 
securities (described in chapter 5). The estimates for coupon payments on government 
securities use the coupon rates collected in the names of the securities.  
Figure 6 presents the series for dividend and interest income derived from the 
information on dividend yields and coupon rates of the database.45 The figure also 
presents yearly estimates from the income account of the current account from the 
existing literature (Mitchell 1988). Since dividend and interest incomes on external 
assets and liabilities are the source of the revenues represented by the income 
account, the comparison between the two sets of series is direct. The series “Income 
Assets New” represents the dividend and interest income from foreign railroad and 
government securities while the series “Income Liabilities New” represents the 
dividend and interest income from British railroad and government securities. The 
levels of both series are close to the ones from the literature, with minor deviations. 
While the increase in dividends / interest income from 1905 to 1914 is more 
accentuated in the new asset series (probably due to the growth of the stock of foreign 
railroad securities), both asset series (from this paper and from Mitchell) oscillate 
around 6-7% of GDP annually from 1880 to 1905. The new liabilities series is above 
the corresponding series from the literature for most of the period. The new liabilities 
series actually declines a bit over time while the series from Mitchell rises a bit. Since 
                                                 
44 The IMM and the financial market of the period 1869-1914 do not differentiate between equity and 
debt securities. Coupon payments of debt securities were also called dividend payments. I usually use 
the modern terminology. 
45 For each security and each month, the coupon rate and the dividend yields were multiplied by the 
outstanding value of the capital of the security. The result is the dividend / interest income in pounds 
sterling. This income was multiplied by the factors of 0.6, 0.8 and 0.2 respectively for foreign 
government securities, foreign railroad securities and British securities. After aggregation into two 




the British external liabilities position was small in comparison to the external assets 
position, the liabilities yields are also small in comparison to asset yields. 
 
Figure 6: Dividend and coupon income on external assets and liabilities (percentage 
of GDP). Series “New” are calculated by multiplying the coupon rate and the 
dividend yields by the outstanding value of the capital of each security and 
aggregating (taking into account the percentages of 80/60/20). “Mitchell” refers to the 
estimates of the income account of the current account from Mitchell (1988). 
 
Figure 7 presents average excess rates of return for the period 1869-1914 by 
class of investment (railroads/sovereign) and country.46 Excess rates of return are 
obtained by subtracting the rates of return on corresponding British securities from 
the rates of return on foreign securities, in order to represent accurately the spread 
                                                 
46 Average excess rates of return are the capital gains + dividend yields / coupon rates for securities of 
a particular country discounted of capital gains + dividend yields / coupon rates for British securities. 
For example, the average monthly rate of return of Brazilian securities was 0.13% - 0.25% higher than 
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between assets and liabilities from the viewpoint of a British investor. The maximum 
rate of return on railroads is higher than the maximum rate of return on sovereign 
securities, but the lowest rate of return on sovereigns (-0.13% per month) is higher 
than the lowest rate of return on railroads (-0.77% per month), which means that 
railroad securities are riskier than sovereign securities. Latin America is the continent 
with highest rates of return in general. Figure 8 presents the breakdown for railroad 
securities into common equity, preferred equity and debt (all foreign sovereign 





Figure 7: Average monthly excess return for 1869-1914 (percentage). Colors 
represent capital gains + dividend yields / coupon rates for securities of the country 
























Figure 8: Average monthly railroad securities excess return for 1869-1914 by railroad 
class of asset (percentage).  Colors represent capital gains + dividend yields / coupon 
rates for railroad securities of the country discounted of capital gains + dividend 






















Aggregate Exorbitant Privilege 
My benchmark measure of net revenues earned by Britain vis-vis the rest of 
the world (or aggregate exorbitant privilege) is the sum of the excess capital gains and 
dividend/interest income calculated from the proxies for external liabilities and assets 
in the previous sections. Capital gains are the sum of the differences between market 
price series and issuance price series of foreign securities (railroad / sovereign) minus 
the differences between market price series and issuance price series of British 
securities (railroad / sovereign) in Figure 5. Dividend and interest income come from 
Figure 6. Figure 9 presents the results as a percentage of GDP. Since liabilities are 
scaled by a factor of 0.2 (20% foreign holdings of British securities), most of the 
dynamics of net revenues comes from the dynamics of capital gains and 
dividend/interest income from external assets. The growth in net revenues is in 
tandem with the increase in the net external position of the United Kingdom from 
1869 to 1880.  For the first decade of the sample, Britain paid returns to the rest of the 
world because net capital gains were negative and net dividend/interest income was 
positive but small in comparison to capital gains. From 1880 to 1914, revenues from 
capital gains on foreign railroad securities and to a lesser extent from foreign 
government securities boosted the revenues received by Britain. The series reached 
peaks of 40% of GDP in some months but the average is stable at a level just below 
20% of GDP. The average for the whole period (1869-1914) is 13.4% of GDP, with 
substantial fluctuations.47 
                                                 
47 Table 7 and Table 8 of the appendix show that the ratios of 80% for British ownership of foreign 
railroads securities, 60% of British ownership of foreign sovereign securities, 20% of foreign 
ownership of British securities assumed in this paper are not determinant for the result. Table 7 varies 





Figure 9: Measure of net revenues earned by Britain vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
(aggregate exorbitant privilege as a percentage of GDP). Revenues are the sum of 
excess capital gains (differences between market price series and issuance price series 
in Figure 5) and dividend and interest income from Figure 6. The two components 
(from Figure 5 and Figure 6) take into account the percentages of 80/60/20. 
 
What do these figures mean in terms of equation 4? Figure 10 presents the 
answer. The left-hand side of equation 4 represents the capital gains and dividend 
yields on external assets ( + ! − .) while the right-hand side adds the yields and 
capital gains on external liabilities ( + ! − .) scaled by the ratio of liabilities 
over assets (	
 	
)⁄ ). The condition for the existence of exorbitant privilege is 
fulfilled for almost the whole period, with the exception of the period 1869 - 1880. 
                                                                                                                                           
ownership of British securities by foreigners from 0% to 30%. In Table 8, the ratio of ownership of 
foreign government securities by British varies from 50% to 80% while the ratio of ownership of 
British securities by foreigners varies from 0% to 30%.  In the two tables, using the most adverse 
conditions to the existence of revenues (high ownership of British securities by foreigners and low 
ownership of foreign securities by British), the estimates reached a low level of around 11% of GDP 

















Since British external liabilities are tiny with comparison to British external assets, 
the right-hand side of the equation is almost flat (since it is scaled by liabilities over 
assets) with comparison to the left-hand side.  
 
Figure 10: Equation 4 for Britain in the period 1869 – 1914. Equation 4 is ( + ! −
.) > ( + ! − .) (	
 	
)⁄ , where , !,  , ! , ., 		
 and 		
	are 
respectively capital gains on assets, dividend yields / interest rates on assets, capital 
gains on liabilities, dividend yields / interest rates on liabilities, nominal growth rate 
of GDP and external liabilities and external assets. 
 
On average, the pure exorbitant privilege enjoyed by Britain was strong 
enough to manifest itself in aggregate terms. The aggregate revenues received by 
Britain were larger than the estimates for the US in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century and represented by themselves a significant macroeconomic value, 
comparable for example to the investment component of the GDP of many countries. 
In the next chapter, I further explore the implications and nuances of British 
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Chapter 4: Further Analysis of Exorbitant Privilege 
The main result of chapter 3 is that Britain enjoyed a significant exorbitant 
privilege. In this chapter, I analyze several issues related to the existence of exorbitant 
privilege. The first section deals with inflation differentials. The main goal is to 
assess if inflation differentials are a cause of nominal returns differentials, a step 
ahead from the international finance literature. The section that follows reproduces 
analysis from the international finance literature in order to understand the channels 
through which British exorbitant privilege manifested itself.  The two final sections 
study the importance of the size of Britain’s net external position, Britain’s status of 
creditor (instead of debtor, as is the case for the US in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century) and the currency composition of Britain’s net external assets as a factor 
underlying the existence of British exorbitant privilege.  
Inflation 
An important observation with respect to the rates of return calculated above 
is that they are nominal, since information contained in the IMM are nominal. 
Dividend yields and capital gains are calculated by using nominal values of capital 
for each security. A possible explanation for the difference in nominal returns 
between securities of two countries could be the difference in inflation rates between 
countries. British investors could demand a higher nominal return from securities of 
other countries to assure that they would be receiving a similar real return to British 
securities. The difference in returns would be purely a difference in nominal returns.  
The exorbitant privilege literature with respect to the US calculates nominal returns 




and the US in the last quarter of the twentieth century is the main reason to calculate 
nominal returns to Britain.48 The advent of persistent high inflation occurs in the 
twentieth century after the Second World War, which means that it is a more serious 
issue for estimates of returns in the last quarter of the twentieth century than before 
the First World War.49  
Securities denominated in pounds sterling from foreign countries are protected 
from inflation. In theory, other securities could be vulnerable, but persistent higher 
rates of inflation with respect to other countries should not be a frequent event under 
the gold standard, since the discrepancy of prices would create a deficit in the trade 
balance and trigger gold movements. A complete comparison of real rates of returns 
across the globe is not the objective of this section. Instead, I focus on the rates of 
inflation of Britain and the US. Data availability and the position of the US as the 
largest destination of British capital and the country with the most non pound-
denominated securities determine the choice of the US. 
Figure 11 plots price indexes for the two countries (indexes with the base-year 
of 1873=100 in the panel above and rates of inflation year over year in the panel 
below).50 In the beginning of the period, the US prices fell (possibly as a correction 
for high inflation during the Civil War). From 1873 to 1895, both countries followed 
                                                 
48 The calculation of inflation differentials is the first necessary step for future work that tries to 
explain exorbitant privilege empirically. 
49 Here I make a difference between persistent high inflation that was experienced in several countries 
in the second half of the twentieth century (such as the extreme experience of Brazil until 1994) and 
hyperinflation episodes, such as the one experienced by Germany between the wars.  
50 Series for the US are the average of three indexes contained in Carter et al. (2006): the General Price 
Index (Snyder-Tucker), the Wholesale Price Index All Commodities (Warren and Pearson) and the 
Wholesale Price Index (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Series for Britain are the average of three indexes 
contained in Mitchell (1988): the Rousseaux Price Indices, the Sauerbeck-Statist Price Indices and the 




similar dynamics and experienced strong deflation. From 1895 to 1900, inflation is 
positive again in both countries. The first large divergence occurs from 1900 to 1905, 
when the US experiences inflation and British prices are stable. From 1905 to 1914, 
both countries experience positive inflation, with a higher average in the US. At least 
for the period analyzed, inflation differentials between the two countries do not seem 
to be significant or a major cause for nominal returns differentials. The period 
between 1900 and 1905 is the only one with a substantial inflation differential. 
Another interesting aspect of the period 1873 to 1895 is that nominal rates of return 
are higher than ex-post real rates of return (using realized inflation to calculate the 
real rates of return).51 Average inflation rate for the period 1872-1914 is -0.4% for the 
US and -0.5% for Britain.  
                                                 
51 Persistent deflation affects expectations as well. If estimates of expectations of inflation were 






Figure 11: Prices in Britain and the US. Panel A (above): Average of price indexes 
(1873=100). Panel B (Below): Inflation Year over Year. Sources: Mitchell (1988) for 
Britain and Carter et al. (2006) for the US. 
 
Composition and return effects for capital gains 
GR (2007) decompose excess returns in the US in the second half of the 




of the US, external assets are dominated by classes of assets with higher risk profile 
than those of external liabilities. Figure 12 shows the composition of British securities 
(government and railroads) in the top panel and of foreign securities (government and 
railroads) in the lower panel. The top panel represents the portfolio composed of 
British external liabilities and the lower panel the portfolio composed of British 
external assets.52 The usual ascendant scale of risk goes from debt (which promises a 
fixed return to the investor) to preferred shares (which promise a fixed return after the 
payment of bonds) and to common shares (the residual receivers of eventual profit 
distribution).  The first important aspect to notice in the two panels is the relative 
dominance of debt instruments. The share of debt is higher than 85% in the lower 
panel and ranges from 80% to 60% in the upper panel.  The immediate conclusion 
from Figure 12 is that there is a large difference between the composition of British 
external assets and British external liabilities. Taking into account that debt securities 
are associated with a lower profile of risk, the figure suggests that Britain’s profile 
was the inverse of the US of the late twentieth century: external assets were 
dominated by classes of securities with a lower risk profile than those of external 
liabilities.53 
 
                                                 
52 In order to carry out the analysis presented in this section, I assume that foreign investors bought 
British assets in a fixed proportion with respect to the total amount traded at the LSE. For example, 
investors would hold portfolios composed of 50% of British government securities and 50% of British 
railway securities. This might not be true, since foreign investors may have been biased to one type of 
British security. If that security was government bonds, the estimates presented here are a lower bound 
of the possible range for the composition effect. 





Figure 12: Composition of portfolios in terms of class of assets. (In black and 
white charts, debt is the area below). 
 
Table 5 and Figure 13 present the decomposition of total excess returns 
(capital gains + dividend yields) on British net external assets into the composition 
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The total excess return here corresponds to a weighted exorbitant 
privilege, since I am not taking into account that British assets are much larger 
than British liabilities.54 The total return effect is the difference between returns of 
assets and liabilities within each class of asset (sovereign, railroad debt, railroad 
common equity, and railroad preferred equity), not taking into account the shares 
of each class of asset in the composition of assets and liabilities. As an example, 
the difference in returns between British railroad common equity and foreign 
railroad common equity contributes to the total return effect. 
 The composition effect is the difference in returns caused by differences 
in the composition of the asset and liability portfolios. If external assets are less 
concentrated in equity than external liabilities, the difference between the share of 
equity in assets and the share of equity in liabilities is negative. For example, if 
equities are 10% of assets and 30% of liabilities, the difference is -20%. The 
composition effect for equity is -20% multiplied by the average of the returns of 
equities on assets and equities on liabilities. Given the returns on individual asset 
classes (the average between the returns of the same class in assets and liabilities), 
                                                 
54 The difference between British and American relative sizes of gross external assets and liabilities is 
important. While for the US gross external liabilities are 1 to 1.5 times the size of the gross external 
assets (175% of GDP compared to 150% of GDP on average from 1990 to 2004), for Britain gross 
external assets were probably more than 10 times higher than gross external liabilities during this 
period (180% of GDP compared to 10% of GDP). While GR (2007) were giving equal weight to 
comparable magnitudes (150% of GDP and 175% of GDP), I am giving equal weights to completely 
different magnitudes. The direct consequence is that some of the results might be counterintuitive. This 




the different compositions of assets and liabilities generate different aggregate 
returns. 
Given the composition of UK’s external assets and liabilities in Figure 12, 
it is no surprise that the composition effect is negative: the portfolio composed of 
British external assets is less risky than the portfolio composed of British external 
liabilities. A large part of the result comes from railroad equity securities, while 
sovereign securities present a positive composition effect for most decades (since 
sovereign securities are all debt). The total return effect on British net external 
assets derives from the difference in returns within each class of asset and not 
from the different composition of assets and liabilities. Since the composition 
effect is negative, positive total excess returns mean that the return effect is 
positive and large. The overall total excess return is positive (0.1%), but this is a 
result largely of the decade from 1900 to 1909. For those years, the total return 
effect was 5.8%, boosted by strong returns in railroad securities of all classes. In 
most other decades, the total return effect is positive but not large enough to 
compensate for the negative composition effect. The results for the total return 
effect are compatible in terms of overall magnitude with the findings of GR 
(2007) and Habib (2010) for the US in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Because the composition effect for the US is positive and for Britain is usually 
negative, the overall total excess return for Britain is smaller than for the US in 
the twentieth century. The fact that the total return effect is positive confirms the 
findings of Table 3 about pure exorbitant privilege: British securities paid a lower 




invested mainly in safe assets (debt) took away part of the benefit of issuing the 
global reserve currency.55 
 
 
Table 5: Average yearly returns for each class of asset by decade. 
 
The results of Table 5 are presented graphically by year in Figure 13. The 
strong contributions to the total return effect of railroad securities are observable in 
the years of 1900, 1901 and 1908. Sovereign securities usually contribute to a 
positive composition effect while railroad common stocks usually make a negative 
contribution to the composition effect. For most years, the components are between -
5% and +5% but there are extremes of almost -15% and +15%. 
                                                 
55 I am not claiming that investment in safe assets is a flawed strategy. I am just claiming that Britain 






Figure 13: Composition of average annualized monthly returns by year 




It is clear from the last section that the overall excess returns from the British 
net external position were positive but very low, because Britain’s external asset 
position was less risky than Britain’s external liabilities position. With a low total 
excess return (0.1%), how is it possible that Britain received a large amount of 
revenues from the rest of the world? The answer is that Britain was a surplus country 
and accumulated a large net external position, which reached around 180% of GDP 
on the eve of the First World War. By contrast, the US has maintained a large 
negative external position in recent decades. Is it possible that Britain received large 
aggregate revenues from the rest of world simply because its large positive net 
external position leveraged small excess returns? Figure 14 answers this question by 
plotting three series. The first one (“Actual”) is the actual ratio of liabilities over 
assets derived from my data. The second one (“No Income”) is the ratio of liabilities 
over assets that would make the right-hand side of Equation 4 equal to the left-hand 
side of Equation 4, given the (monthly) returns calculated for Figure 10.56 For 
example, if returns on aggregate assets are 1.1% and returns on aggregate liabilities 
are 1% (meaning that excess returns are 0.1%), the left-hand side of equation 4 is 
0.011 and the right-hand side is 0.01*(	
 	
⁄ ).57 In order for the left-hand side to 
be equal to the right-hand side, the ratio of liabilities over assets (	
 	
⁄ ) has to 
be 110%. If returns on liabilities are higher than returns on assets, the ratio of 
liabilities over assets will be lower than 100% (and the country has to be a net 
creditor to receive a positive income from the rest of the world). The chart also 
                                                 
56 (	
 	
)⁄ = ( + ! − .)/( + ! − .) given , !,  , !  calculated for Figure 10. 




depicts the ratio of liabilities over assets for the US for the period 1982-2004 (the line 
was “stretched” in order to compare to Britain, so that one year for the US series in 
the lower axis corresponds to two years of the two British series in the upper axis). 
From the series “Actual”, Britain maintained a large and growing creditor position 
with the ratio of liabilities over assets falling from 30% to close to 10% over the 
period. From the series “No Income” and given the capital gains and dividend yields 
on assets and liabilities, the ratio of liabilities over assets needed to equalize returns 
on Britain’s assets and liabilities would be below 100% for most of the period. Britain 
would not have been able to sustain a negative net external position during this 
period. This pattern changed after 1900, which is in accordance with the results of 
Table 5. The US has been able to maintain a negative net position that was not 
sustainable by Britain, given the low excess returns (in comparison to the US) that the 
latter received. Britain received large revenues from the rest of the world because of 
its large and positive net external position, but the net returns on its external position 
would have not allowed Britain to reach the status of a debtor country receiving 
positive revenues from the rest of the world until 1900. The source of British income 
from its external position is the difference between the blue line (“No Income”) and 
the orange line (“Actual”) in Figure 14. The greater is the difference between the two 
lines, the larger is the leveraging of a small returns differential by a large positive 
stock position. After 1900, Britain would have been able to be a debtor country 
receiving positive revenues, and is it is possible that its ratio of liabilities to assets 





Figure 14: Comparison of actual British Liabilities over Assets (1871 - 1914) to 
simulated British Liabilities over Assets with no income and US Liabilities over 
Assets (1982 - 2004). 
Currency returns 
This section investigates returns differentials between currencies. The country 
that issues the global reserve currency derives an advantage because its liabilities are 
denominated in the global reserve currency while its assets are denominated in other 
currencies. The case of Britain is distinct for two reasons. The international monetary 
arrangement was the gold standard, which meant that most currencies in the world 
operated under a system of fixed exchange rates. Each currency in theory would be 
equivalent to the pound sterling, since it was convertible into gold and gold was 
convertible into pounds sterling. The main risk to the investor originated from the 
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Actual: British LoA derived from new data




majority of the foreign securities traded in London were denominated in pounds, and 
the majority of the securities denominated in other currencies contained gold and 
sterling clauses. Considering these two caveats, Figure 15 presents the breakdown of 
Figure 9 into securities denominated in pounds and securities denominated in other 
currencies.58 Even though they comprised a minority of the securities traded at the 
LSE, securities denominated in other currencies represent a significant share of net 
returns after 1900, while the net returns from pound denominated securities gradually 
decreased. The shift in excess returns after 1900 comes from securities denominated 
in other currencies. Had the new trend been maintained after 1914, Britain could have 
received a growing benefit from its external asset position.  
 
Figure 15: Measure of net revenues earned by Britain vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
(aggregate exorbitant privilege): breakdown between foreign securities in pounds and 
foreign securities in other currencies. 
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In this chapter, I analyzed several important qualifications to the result on 
exorbitant privilege from chapter 3. The excess returns on Britain’s net external 
position were low when compared to the US. Britain invested in safer assets, which 
meant that it dissipated part of the advantage of issuing the global reserve currency. 
Britain still received large net revenues from the rest of the world, due to its large 
positive external position. After 1900, the currency composition and the estimation of 
the maximum sustainable ratio of liabilities over assets indicate that the structure of 
the external position was changing. Britain might have been able to sustain a debtor 




Chapter 5: Data 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the data sources in order to 
facilitate its use in future research. I also explain the procedures used for cleaning and 
organizing the data.  Two preliminary sections follow. The first one examines the role 
of the London Stock Exchange as the global conduit of British capital. The next one 
clarifies the classification of capital between direct and portfolio investment for the 
period 1870-1914 and highlights the importance of portfolio flows as the prime type 
of British exports of capital. The main point of the two sections is to justify the use of 
the data from the LSE as a good proxy for calculating the British external position. 
London Stock Exchange 
Britain was the most advanced economy of the time and the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) was the largest and most liquid exchange in the world by far. 
According to Davis and Gallman (2001, page 182), in 1910 one-third of the paid-up 
value of all negotiable securities on the planet were quoted on the LSE. The London 
Stock Exchange was the international stock exchange. Foreign companies (for 
example, American railroads) issued securities there. In comparison, the New York 
Stock Exchange was almost exclusively a market for domestic securities.  Investors 
from other countries, such as France, utilized the services of the LSE when 
composing their investment portfolios. As Platt (1986) points out: “The existence of 
so much foreign business in London was the reason why the LSE was closed on 31 
July 1914, only three days after the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, when 




abroad.” Besides lower tax rates, British investors enjoyed cultural proximity and 
knowledge of the most active financial sector of the time: American railroad 
securities.59  Platt lists the convertibility of the pound sterling and Britain’s 
worldwide network of shipping, trade and finance as other factors that made London 
a “home for funds irrespective of interest rates.” The British legal system should be 
added to that list.  
Portfolio and Direct Investment Flows 
The export of British capital primarily took the form of portfolio investment. 
The IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual defines portfolio investment as “transactions 
and positions involving debt or equity securities”. Also according to the Manual, 
securities “have the characteristic feature of negotiability. That is, their legal 
ownership is readily capable of being transferred by delivery or endorsement”.  Platt 
estimates that direct investment (the other main foreign investment category besides 
portfolio investment) was only 8% to 15% of total British investment overseas.60 
With respect to the most important destination of British foreign railroad investments 
for this period, Wilkins (2009) affirms, “it has long been accepted that in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the value of foreign portfolio investment far 
exceeded that of foreign direct investment in the United States.”61  
                                                 
59 The Appendix contains an analysis of this important sector with the new data presented here.   
60 The formal definition according to the Manual is “Direct investment is a category of cross-border 
investment associated with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of 
influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy.” 
61 The type of investment probably varied with the destination. American firms issued securities in 
London (portfolio flows) but British investors formed and managed companies in Latin America 
(which constitutes direct investment). A high share of direct investment in total investment can be an 
indicator of low trust in local institutions, as analyzed in Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) and 




According to Platt, the definition of direct investment employed before 1914 
was capital invested privately that did not pass through a public stock exchange, or 
“investment that did not leave traces in the securities markets”. However, according 
to modern practice, some investments in securities are classified as direct investment 
if the share acquired by the investor is high enough to guarantee operational control 
of the firm (the threshold is 10%). After describing the methodology they used for 
equity, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) say: “Given that the difference between 
portfolio equity investment and FDI can be blurred in some cases, we would ideally 
want to estimate both stocks according to the same methodology.”  Part of the 
investments registered as portfolio before 1914 would be classified as direct 
investment in modern terms, which means that the LSE captured some of what is now 
considered direct investment. 
Since Britain was the largest exporter of capital for the period analyzed and 
the largest share of this investment was in the form of portfolio securities, the London 
Stock Exchange was the natural conduit through which those resources reached their 
destinations. This is fortunate, since the data coming from organized markets are the 
best available in terms of quality and standardization. Portfolio data also contain two 
classes of assets with different profiles of risk: debt and equity. This provides a 
minimum variety of classes to assess overall portfolio positions. 
My primary data source is the Investor's Monthly Manual (IMM) from 1869 
to 1914. The IMM was a monthly publication providing financial information to 
capital market investors. It has been used extensively as a data source for studying 




the securities traded on the London Stock Exchange and other local British stock 
exchanges, including stocks and bonds along with specific information described in 
the next sections.62, 63 The International Center for Finance (ICF) of the Yale School 
of Management recently digitalized the pages of every issue of the IMM from 1869 to 
1929 and transformed the data into an electronic database.   
The second data source is the Stock Exchange Yearbook (SEY).64 It was an 
annual publication with the purpose of serving as a compendium of information for 
the securities listed in the London Stock Exchange. The annual SEY is a perfect 
complement to the more timely IMM, since it contained detailed information in the 
form of text for each company and security. Figure 16 and Figure 17 contain 
respectively samples of the IMM and the SEY.65,66    
                                                 
62 The IMM is a precursor of modern financial information systems such as Reuters and Bloomberg. 
Besides the Stock Exchange Yearbook mentioned below, another source of information on securities 
traded in the LSE is the Stock Exchange Intelligence (also known as Burdett’s Stock Exchange 
Intelligence).  
63 The nomenclature used in this chapter is modern. In the original data, a variety of names were used 
to denote fixed-income securities or securities founded in debt: sovereign bonds were called stocks, 
while railway bonds were called debenture stocks (and the coupon rate was stated in the name of the 
security). Securities modernly known as stocks or equities were usually called shares. Nonetheless, 
sometimes the expression capital stock was used. Shares were classified as ordinary, preference or 
deferred. Ordinary share or simply share corresponds to the modern common stock. Preference shares 
(or modernly preferred stocks) were securities with priority over common stocks on earnings after the 
payment of bonds (and usually had a fixed return rate). Deferred shares were securities that would be 
paid after common stocks. The existence of deferred shares had the practical effect of transforming 
common stocks into preferred stocks, since a threshold had to be established in order to start the 
payment of deferred shares. It is not clear how voting rights were distributed with respect to ordinary 
and preference shares. 
64 Microfilms of the editions of the Stock Exchange Yearbook from 1875 to 1895 were acquired and 
transformed into PDFs thanks to the generous support of the fellowship instituted by the family of 
Professor Allan G. Gruchy at the University of Maryland.  
65 The explanations of the next section contain expressions such as “last month”, “current month” or 
“last year”. Since this analysis refers to the content of an issue of the IMM, the reader should keep in 
mind that “last year” is the year before the year of publication of a specific IMM issue. On the same 
token, “last month” refers to the last month before the month of publication of an IMM issue.   

















A typical IMM entry included:  
- Name of the security. This contains the name of the company or country that 
issued the security, type of security (debenture, stock, preferred, deferred or 
common share, guarantees, and if it was based on a mortgage) and additional 
information such as coupon rate, issuance price or year of redemption 
(maturity).67 
- Number of shares or amount of stock. This column contains the number of 
shares in the case of stocks or the total amount of the monetary value of bond 
issues (face value of each bond times the number of bonds issued). In the case of 
railway companies, this column was named “Capital Subscribed” and for most of 
the period contained a pound sign (and dollar signs for specific securities 
denominated in dollars). For sovereign bonds, the column name was “Amount of 
Loan Unredeemed”. The section for sovereign bonds also contained another 
column called “Original Issue”. The difference between “Original Issue” and 
“Amount Unredeemed” was usually the result of sinking funds (a mechanism of 
gradual redemption of the issue - explained in detail in footnote 30). In this paper, 
the variable amount of stock is usually called total capital.  
- Capital share or stock. The indivisible nominal/face value of one share or the 
capital amount divided by the number of shares. When the security is a stock, the 
word “Stock” replaces numbers in the IMM. The typical share for bonds was 200 
                                                 
67 In the case of railways, the majority of bonds were described as mortgages, since real assets (lands, 




pounds or 1000 dollars. This column is absent in the section for sovereign bonds.  
- “Paid’’ or par value. A company could issue a bond or a stock at a certain price 
but only demand that the investor pay upfront a percentage of the total price (for 
example 50%). At any time in the future, the shareholders could be called to pay 
the difference. The expression used at the time was “capital call”. This was an 
incipient mechanism of contingent capital. When a new security was issued, the 
expression used was “capital created” and could include the whole amount of the 
issue, even the part that was not called yet. 
- Prices of the month. These are market quotations for the price of the security. 
There are four columns:  opening (price of the first day of the month), highest 
(highest price reached during the month), lowest (lowest price reached during the 
month), and latest (closing price of the month). The “last business done” column 
indicates the quotation of the last trade of the previous month if the security was 
not traded during the current month. The price quotation is usually “per cent”, 
meaning the price an investor would pay to acquire an equivalent of 100 pounds 
(or 500 dollars) of the nominal value of the security, even if the capital share was 
higher. In this sense, most of the prices at the LSE were quoted around the value 
100 and it was easy to distinguish between a security that was trading below par 
and above par. The exceptions referred to securities (usually equity) with share 
value below 100 (for example GBP 10 or GBP 50). In this case, the quotation was 
per share and the price was around the nominal value of the share.68,69 
                                                 
68 The interval of the price variation is a reasonable indicator for the amount being negotiated, but 




- Last four dividends paid. This section represented the coupon or dividend 
payments. Several formats for the presentation were used over the years. In earlier 
years, the format took advantage of the fact that the coupon rate was included in 
the name of the security and simply stated the months or frequency of payments 
of the dividends, such as “Feb&Aug” or “hy” referring to semi-annual payments 
and “qa” for quarterly payments. Later, the format evolved to include the actual 
payment and the date of payments, probably due to the fact that effective 
payments were often different from the coupon rate. This was represented by four 
numbers and four dates (“6 6 6 6 Jan94 Aug94 Jan95 Aug95”). The actual 
payment was generally given by a percentage of the nominal value, but there were 
cases of dividends presented in terms of pounds, shillings and pence.70 Most 
importantly, this section also indicates periods when coupons were not paid. In 
this case, it is possible to note frozen dates for an extended period. Besides that, 
sometimes the word “nil” would be included in the date when a payment was 
supposed to happen. If the lack of payments covered an extended period, a simple 
expression “nil since” was included along the date of the last payment. When 
payments resumed, the period without payment became “nil between”. 
- Last year dividend yields Investor at Latest Price Percent. Total dividend 
                                                                                                                                           
“usual” price level is important information for aggregations of data, since it determines the right 
factor to weight the prices of securities. The Railway Times is a useful crosscheck for this information 
with respect to railroads securities. 
69 The IMM usually reported accurate issuance prices. When the issuance price was included in the 
name of the security, the manual would just indicate the premium over the indicated price with “p” or 
“pm” next to it (“d” was used for a discount). Large returns would be found if the premium is 
mistakenly used in the place of the price. 
70 ICF created a new column with the values in pounds, shillings and pence converted to total pence 




yields for the previous (“last”) year in pounds, shillings and pence. This column 
was introduced in June 1879 taking into account the two last dividends. Around 
1885, it started to take into account all the dividends paid in the last year. Until 
December 1882, it simply represented the dividends or coupon payments given by 
the section “Last four dividends paid” (and multiplied by the nominal value) 
divided by the market price. After January 1883 and with the arrival of a new 
editor to the IMM, the calculation started to include the expected capital gain 
between the current market price and the redemption value. This included 
thousands of calculations of compound interest rates when the redemption date 
was years ahead of the current date.  
- The sovereign bonds section was slightly different from the other sections. The 
columns “Original issue” and “Amount of Loan Unredeemed” were already 
explained above. It also contained a separate “Issue Price” column (in other 
sections, this information would be included in the name of securities). Three 
columns were dedicated to sinking funds: how much of the original issue was 
redeemed every year (usually 1%), the months when it was applied and the final 
year of redemption. The last information is particularly useful with respect to the 
calculation of maturities of bonds. Since several schemes for sinking funds 
existed at the time, these columns are permeated by non- standard entries such as 
the one for British securities: “Difference between annual interest and 25,000,000 
pounds applied to purchases, and surplus income for year applied to purchases in 
succeeding years.” 




some editions (June and December), specific notes about the country of the 
company or government could also be included.  
The IMM varied the way it presented the data over the period. Securities were 
normally organized by purpose, for example with sovereign bonds in one section and 
company bonds in another; railway companies usually had their own section. Other 
important sections were “mining” and “banks and financial companies”. The rest of 
the companies, including utilities, were included in the category “miscellaneous”. The 
sections changed over the years, reflecting the increasing complexity of the market. 
The section for railway companies was split by country (or region) in 1895, after 
which there were specific sections for British railways, American railways, Colonial 
railways ex-India and Indian railways. These sections make the assessment of the 
country of origin for each security straightforward for the later periods. Before that, 
the identification relies on the name of the security. In the case of sovereign bonds, 
identification is straightforward.71 The names of securities of railway companies, 
                                                 
71 The classification could change according to political developments. The regions of Australia 
(example: Tanzania) and Canada (example: British Columbia) were considered autonomous entities 
before the formal creation of federations. They were classified as Australian and Canadian nonetheless 
(Newfoundland was considered as Canadian despite the fact that it joined the federation much later). A 
single Confederate bond (guarantee by cotton) was classified as American. Boer’s colonies such as 
Orange Free State and Transvaal were autonomous countries in the beginning of the sample and later 
became part of the Union of South Africa, a colony of Britain. Their securities were classified under 
Britain in the last issues of the IMM but I opted to classify them as South African in the database. I 
also classified Prussian and North German Confederation’s securities as German. For a variety of 
reasons, the government of Britain issued guarantees for sovereign bonds of other countries, usually 
but not necessarily protectorates or dominions. As in the case of South Africa, they were initially 
inserted under the country that issued them but later they were moved to the British space and a note 
under the country’s space stated “See Britain”. We classified those securities according to nationality 
and not the guarantee. A case of a non-colony security with a British (and French) guarantee is the 




subnational debt and utilities companies are usually linked to their place of origin. 
The SEY was extensively used to clarify the countries of some companies.72 
The IMM contained other sections besides the tables with financial 
information described above. In some editions there was a “Tabular History of the 
Money” with the history of changes in the discount rates from the Bank of England. 
The editors of the journal analyzed companies and the general state of the market in 
the first section. The last section was dedicated to notices and reports from 
companies. A table of “Home Railway Traffic Returns” listed the revenues and other 
operational statistics from the most important railway companies in each continent. 
More important was another table by the name of “British Capital Created and 
Called”. This table contained information on new issues of securities, including how 
much of each security was already paid and if the company was calling for more 
capital. There was a subsection of securities that were “subscribed partly abroad”, 
meaning that part of the capital stated was raised in other countries in spite of the fact 
that the table states the total amount of the capital subscription. 
Data Cleaning 
There are several issues with respect to the identification of securities. The 
ICF file provides codes for each security but securities are not always tracked 
correctly for several reasons.73 This problem is particularly severe for large 
                                                 
72 Some railway companies are listed as American but their business is performed in other countries. 
This is the case of some Mexican railway companies and the Panama railway company. The last 
provided the link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans before the construction of the canal. 
73ICF is still working on the identification codes. A table with all the modifications made to the 




companies that issued several securities simultaneously. Unfortunately, the names of 
the securities are not always reliable. In order to save printing space, the IMM only 
stated the name of the company for the first security listed. All the following 
securities for that same company list “do” (from ditto) to indicate that the name of the 
company is the same as the one of the security listed above. This is also true for 
securities that share some kind of characteristic, such as coupon rates. The first entry 
states the characteristic and subsequent entries use the word “do”, listing only the 
security’s distinct characteristic (for example, a different maturity). The ICF 
reproduces for each of the following securities the whole name of the first security, 
and the additional information is listed in a different column called “Security 
Description”. Other issues that make it difficult to identify securities include: 
- Names of securities given in the IMM change over time, usually with the addition 
of more information, such as year of maturity, coupon rate, issuance price, 
guarantees provided by other companies, and the existence of a gold or sterling 
clause. The basic information is the type of security (if it is a stock, bond, 
preferred share, ordinary share or mortgage).74 
- Large companies actively managed liabilities. In several cases, companies 
redeemed securities before their original maturity and switched them for securities 
with lower yields or longer maturities. Companies also merged securities or 
created new securities by splitting others. 
- New companies were created and existing companies failed and were bought by 
                                                 
74During the analyzed period, the editors of the IMM made efforts to homogenize the names of the 





other investors. Mergers and acquisitions were especially common for railways, 
since, for example, local railways were combined to cover larger geographic 
areas. All those processes implied name changes.75 Companies also issued 
securities for spin-offs. For instance, a company might issue separate series of 
securities for a specific project, such as a tunnel, bridge or even a certain 
extension of the railway to a city or region. 
- The original IMM contained typos. Most were minor but in some cases two 
securities switched places from one month to another. In other cases, the figure in 
the total capital column could be the sum of multiple securities linked by brackets. 
To assign the whole amount to only one security or to repeat the same value for 
all securities inside the brackets would not be accurate.76 
The identification of each security was the first step in cleaning and 
organizing the data. Using the capital column, which tends to be less volatile, each 
security name was tracked for intervals of five years using the IMM issues.77 For each 
security, if any information was added throughout the years, the name was modified 
only to the extent that the new information did not represent a drastic departure from 
                                                 
75For example, the Erie Company changed its name to New York, Lake Erie and Western company 
around 1879. In 1896, it became Erie Railroad again. While such name changes could have been 
associated with a change of management, the fact is that some securities survived the transitions. In 
some cases, the old securities with the new company name were wrongly listed as new securities. 
76The technical appendix lists the procedures used to distinguish between some of these securities. 
77These intervals ended in December of 1869, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910 and 
June of 1914. If a security was not identified through those intervals (in the case of securities with a 
life shorter than 5 years falling between the thresholds), a month and year inside the interval of the life 
of the security was verified. It is necessary to attest that at some point in time the security existed 
alongside others, which excludes the possibility of classification of a security with a new name as a 
new security. Besides the SEY, supplementary sources such as Railway Times, The Banker's Magazine 
and Statistical Register, Moody's Manual of Corporation Securities, Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, The Economist and annual reports from companies were used to check information not 




the former name. If that was the case, a note was included and further investigation 
conducted.  
Once each security was uniquely identified, time series were scanned for 
further problems. Most of the time, a note indicating a sudden change of name led to 
the conclusion of an inappropriate joining of two securities. Similarly, two securities 
with similar names are in most cases one security at different points in time. While 
the capital column was the starting point to identification, all information present in 
the other columns was used to check identification of securities (for example two 
securities with the same amount of capital and name would not be joined if this would 
imply in a sudden jump in prices). Also, caution was taken not to modify security 
movements that are the consequence of regular corporate finance operations, such as 
the exchange of one security for another or the merger and split of securities. 
I use the following procedures to deal with gaps in the data. For the variable 
“total capital,” gaps smaller than six months were linearly interpolated. This length 
avoids filling in observations that represent genuine breaks in the series but covers 
most cases of data missing in the original document. For the variable “price,” the first 
step was to impute missing observations with values from “Last Business Done”.78 
After that, I filled the remaining gaps by linear interpolation independently of the 
length of the gap. I did not use extrapolation: gaps in the beginning or end of the 
series remained blank. For par value and capital share, simple linear interpolation was 
used. 
                                                 
78 It is possible that intervals when prices are not quoted (prices are a blank space) represent periods of 






The database includes new variables that facilitate the handling of 
information. These variables convey useful information (usually contained in the 
name of the security) to classify and summarize the data.  
The variable Return contains the coupon rates of bond and preferred stocks. 
For some securities, the coupon rate decreased or increased over time. In those cases, 
the last coupon rate was registered in Return and the initial coupon rate was registered 
in the variable ReturnInitial.79  
The variable FactorShare describes the factor by which prices should be 
divided in order to represent a “per cent” quotation, meaning the price an investor 
would pay to acquire an equivalent of 100 pounds (or 500 dollars) of the nominal 
value of the security. Since most prices quoted at the IMM already followed the “per 
cent” convention, the mode for this variable is 1. Nonetheless, the variable is an 
important tool to correctly aggregate securities.  
The variable Issued represents the issuance price when available and YearRed 
the year of redemption when available. Country is a three-letter code for the country 
of origin of the company or government that issued the security.80 Type lists the 
sector of the security (“RR” for railways and “GOV” for sovereign - other sectors will 
be added).  
                                                 
79 The ideal procedure would be to create time series of coupon rates for each security, but for 
simplicity I decided to adopt a cross-section classification. Nonetheless, there were only few cases of 
securities with varying coupon rates. 
80 Another variable (CountryName) containing the whole name of the country was utilized for 
government securities in order to include the name of the country in the name of the security. For 




Dummy variables assume only two values: zero or one. Six dummy variables 
were created: Stk, Pref, Curr, Sterling, Gold and JointK. Stk assumes value 1 when 
the security is equity (and zero if it is debt). Given that Stk is 1, Pref assumes value 1 
if the share is preferred (and zero if it is common). Curr assumes value 1 if the capital 
of the security is not quoted in pounds. For railways, the great majority of cases refer 
to dollar securities.81  The symbol of identification of the security’s currency is 
specified as a comment to the security.82 
When Curr is one, Sterling and Gold assume value one in the presence of a 
sterling or gold clause. When the security has a gold or sterling clause, coupon 
payments are fixed in pounds and the investor is not exposed to exchange rate risk. 
As with emerging markets’ sovereign debt in the twentieth century, this clause 
signaled investors’ low trust in the currency. A dollar-denominated security with a 
sterling clause is identical to a security quoted in pounds (but dependent on the 
promise of the company).  
JointK assumes value one if the security’s capital is quoted jointly with 
another security (see the last point of the section Data Cleaning). If that is the case, a 
                                                 
81After the segregation of the section for American railways in 1895, the currency sign was explicitly 
listed, which facilitated the identification of the currency. Before that year, only securities with capital 
not quoted in pound sterling included the currency symbol. The IMM switched the currency of 
quotation of few securities for no apparent reason. The mistaken interpretation of a currency switch 
could lead to the calculation of large capital gains. The switches were identified by large movements in 
all prices (last, low and high) from one month to another. In the case of an American security for 
example, prices could jump from 100 (pounds) to 500 (dollars). All the cases were identified and 
corrected. The usual splicing technique was to convert the second part of the prices series to the 
currency of the first part according to the exchange rate of 5 dollars per pound.    
82 The following symbols were identified for sovereign bonds: Krona (Denmark), Fl (Netherlands), 
Mark (Germany), Kr (Austria-Hungary), Lire (Italy), Yen (Japan),  Fcs (Rumania),  Ruble (Russia), 
Peseta (Spain) and Francs (Switzerland). Some securities from India, Argentina and France almost 
surely were quoted in their national currencies. In the case of railways, besides the pervasive presence 
of the American dollar, some securities from other countries also carried the dollar sign. In the case of 




comment is added to the security in order to identify the other security that shares the 
same value of capital. As is the case with the variable Return, it is possible that two 
securities only share the capital value for a limited period, assuming independent 
capital values afterwards. A comment is also included if that is the case, although the 
variable JointK is not a time series. It simply indicates that the security shared the 
capital value with another security at some point in time. Other relevant 
commentaries for each security are also included in the database.    
Dividends 
The IMM’s dividends section is the least tractable part of the publication. An 
algorithm was created to extract all the information available from the several 
columns representing dividend payments. Dividends were contained in at least four 
columns, corresponding to the last four payments. In the algorithm, each operation is 
repeated four times and the outcome of each column can be verified with the other 
three, since they represent the same time series with lags.83 A basic description of the 
procedure follows: 
- The database was cleaned in order to eliminate typos and non-standard entries. 
All dates were converted to a standard format. 
- Dividends given in pence were converted to values representing the percentage of 
the capital considered as minimum amount (100 pounds or 500 dollars if the 
                                                 
83 An example clarifies the procedure: If the column for the second to last payment of a security in the 
month of March 1897 contains an entry such as Jun1896 and payments of dividends are made two 
times a year in June and December, the Jun1896 entry would be in the column for the last payment 
until December 1896 (or January 1897 if there is a lag). In the case of this security, the column 
corresponding to the second to last payment is identical to the column of the last payment with a lag of 
six months and excluding the last dividend payment. The same is true for the third to the last payment 




capital share or stock was above this value or the capital share or stock if it was 
below 100 pounds). The values in pence could be located in specific columns 
(“Dividends Last Four Pence”). If the values in pence were instead in the column 
“Dividends Last Four Rate Percent per Annum”, they would be accompanied by 
the symbols “$” and “£” or the words “cash” and “currency” would also be in the 
same entry. When dividends were written in the p/s/d format 
(pounds/shillings/pence), it was checked that they were also available in pence 
format, by using the conversion rate of 20 shillings per pound and 12 pence per 
shilling.  
- When figures for dividends were available from the columns “Dividends Last 
Four Rate Percent per Annum” but months were in the format “Jun;Dec” or 
“Jan;Apr;Jul;Oct”, it was considered that the payments were made according to 
those months, meaning that a payment was assigned to each month. Since there 
were four entries at each point in time, it was considered that the stream of 
payments was changed when a month arrived. For example: “Jan;Apr;Jul;Oct” 
was interpreted as “January/1900, April/1900, July/1900, October/1900” from 
October 1900 to December 1900. In January 1901, the stream would change to 
“April/1900, July/1900, October/1900, January/1901”. When the words “nil” or 
“deferred” appeared, no payment was assigned. A blank space in the column 
“Yield Investor at Latest Price” after May 1879 (the year the IMM started 
publishing these figures) was also considered as evidence of lack of payment.  
- When figures for dividends were not available, the coupon rate contained in the 




was possible for debt instruments and preferred shares.  
- Other information contained in the dividend field was transformed to standard 
format when it was possible to interpret it. For example “dividends from Oct 1904 
paid in Dec 1906” were interpreted as a payment in December 1906.84  
- The final step was to convert the dates and values represented in several columns 
into one series containing the coupon payments. A security with an entry like “6 6 
6 6 Jan84 Aug94 Jan95 Aug95” would have entries of 6 in each of the months 
listed in the entry. This new series was called dividends. Duplicated entries were 
excluded. 
- In order to aggregate and smooth series, dividend payments were averaged by 
year and the average was assigned to each month of the year. In calculating the 
average, I took in consideration the number of dividend payments per year (for 
example: two or four), since the IMM figures were already annualized.  
                                                 
84 IMM seems to adopt the principle of assigning dividends to when they were due and not to when 
they were paid. If a company pays dividends twice a year in the months of June and December and for 
some reason the payment of the second dividend happens in January, the IMM would in theory 
describe that payment as “December”. The rule is not always followed. Some companies missed 
payments for many years, and it is highly unlikely that the original schedule of payments was followed 
after resumption of payments (those payments were probably never recovered by investors). In many 
cases, the original schedule was changed after some delays (for example “June and December” 
becomes “August and February” after a June payment was delayed until August). The problem of 
distinction between the two concepts was aggravated by ICF compilers’ different interpretations of 
non-standard entries. For parsimony, I adopted the principle of assigning the payment to the date when 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The main contributions of this work are threefold. By constructing estimates 
of the British net external position, as well as capital gains and dividend yields on the 
British net external position, I determined that Britain received a significant aggregate 
exorbitant privilege. The average net revenues of 13.4% of GDP over the period 
1869-1914 represented an important part of Britain’s economic structure. The country 
satisfied the necessary condition for the existence of an exorbitant privilege for most 
of the period. 
The study also introduces another global reserve currency, the pound sterling, 
and brings another observation to the exorbitant privilege literature in the period 
1870-1914. This important period is comparable in terms of integration of financial 
markets to the last quarter of the twentieth century. Since there was only one global 
reserve currency observation (the US dollar for the second half of the twentieth 
century) before this dissertation, every feature of the particular US case was  
associated with the general exorbitant privilege phenomenon. With the analysis of 
another global reserve currency, it is possible to isolate the idiosyncrasies of the US 
case. One example is the severance of the link between being a debtor country and 
enjoying exorbitant privilege. 
The final main contribution is the new dataset encompassing almost 90% of 
the value of securities traded at the London Stock Exchange. The original source of 
the data has been used in the economic history literature, but I apply it in a novel way 
to build the net external asset position of Britain. The methodology presented here to 




contribution that could be applied to other countries, including the modern United 
States.  
Future steps with respect to the data are: 
- Incorporation of remaining sectors. Although they represent only 12% of the 
value of securities traded at the LSE, some might bring additional insights to 
economic aspects of the period. Examples are commodities, industry, banks and 
local and municipal governments.  Nonetheless, the main results should remain 
intact when the whole sample is incorporated. 
- Refinements of the data and the assumptions. The incorporation of particularities 
of the period such as sinking funds and par values might increase the quality of 
the estimation of exorbitant privilege. A more comprehensive understanding of 
the conventions adopted by the IMM and an exhaustive analysis of the units of 
dividends and currency of securities would also improve measurement.  
- A continuing effort to find and fix errors in the securities in the database.  
- Evidence with respect to other British foreign investments besides portfolio, such 
as direct investment and bank loans. 
A theoretical explanation of exorbitant privilege was beyond the scope of this 
work. Some of the sections try to assess preliminarily hypotheses with respect to the 
origins of the return differential. The most important controls I can think of, besides 
inflation, are default and devaluation risks, volatility and maturity. The inclusion of 
those factors can also be an important step in the direction of developing a more 
theoretically based measure of exorbitant privilege. A serious treatment of risk is the 




issuer of the global reserve currency derive in part from the perception that it is the 
safe asset. One of the many achievements of the literature on Britain’s export of 
capital before WWI is the assessment of the mean-variance frontier of British external 
investments. This assessment could be readily applied to the US in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century if more disaggregated data on the securities that compose the 
US net external position become available to researchers. In this sense, an analysis of 
the role of the US as a global hedge fund or as a global insurance company is 
contingent on an accurate picture of the transformation of risk facilitated by the US 
external position. National statistical compilers should start publishing information on 
the risk of the components of countries’ external assets and liabilities. The 
methodology of this paper can be directly applied to American microeconomic data in 
order to confirm or refute the results based on aggregate data from the international 
finance literature.  
One important topic for future work is the analysis of the ascension of the 
dollar as the global reserve currency. In many of the charts presented in chapters 3, 4 
and in the appendix on American Railroads a clear pattern arises: all the dollar related 
series suffer a structural break around 1895. A big share of the increment on British 
revenues in this period derives from a sudden increase of the market value of 
American securities in comparison to their issuance prices. It is possible that this 
break represents a shift in expectations with respect to devaluation risks. Markets for 
currency futures did not exist, but it might be possible to identify expectations of 




can be disentangled from default risk by comparing movements in the prices of 
government and railroad securities.  
Similarly to the US in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the main part 
of Britain’s excess returns derived from British external assets receiving higher 
returns than were paid on external liabilities for each class of asset.  On the other 
hand, the British invested mostly in debt, a type of security with low returns and low 
risk. Different from the US, Britain’s international investment position did not 
resemble the one from an investment bank, short in safe assets and long in risky 
assets. The lack of a composition effect (less risky assets than liabilities) was a 
handicap to Britain in relation to the US when comparing total returns.  
The low total excess return on its net external position meant that the 
exceptional revenues received by Britain from the rest of the world were more a 
consequence of the sheer size of its net creditor position, which reached around 180% 
of GDP on the eve of the First World War. For most of the period analyzed and given 
the returns calculated above, Britain would not have received positive revenues from 
the rest of the word if it were a net debtor country. After 1900, returns (mostly 
derived from securities in other currencies) increased, which meant that Britain would 
have been able to become a debtor country while still receiving positive net revenues 
from the rest of the world. The First World War probably interrupted this process.  
The results are interesting not only for Britain but also for the US, since they 
allow the parsing out of the differences between two issuers of the global reserve 
currency. At least partially, the United States currently enjoys an exorbitant privilege 




some other unique characteristic. This means that any country that is in the unique 
position of issuing the global reserve currency in the future will enjoy similar benefits 
in terms of investors demanding lower returns to hold its securities.  
The analysis reveals the existence of different responses to the advantage 
presented by an exorbitant privilege, instead of taking as given the particular features 
of the American case. Britain was an exporter of capital, continuously increasing its 
gross asset position. Britain leveraged the benefit from exorbitant privilege in 
proportion to the size of its external assets. Since Britain invested mostly in safe 
assets (debt), the leveraging of a small returns differential by a large positive stock 
position was a fundamental component of the aggregate benefit. In the jargon of this 
dissertation, Britain derived an aggregate exorbitant privilege not from the existence 
of a significant weighted exorbitant privilege, but from the “grossing up” of a small 
weighted exorbitant privilege. 
On the other hand, the United States would be caught in a bubble equilibrium 
in the absence of exorbitant privilege.85 By balancing the current account deficit with 
revenues arising from the position of the dollar as global reserve currency, the 
country has gone deeper and deeper into negative territory with respect to its net 
external position. What seems to be unique with respect to the US is its propensity to 
invest in risky foreign securities. The distinct profiles of risk between American 
external assets and liabilities boost the return differential enjoyed by the US. The 
effect is strong enough to permit the US to be a net debtor country.  These dynamics 
would not be possible without the special position occupied by the dollar in the 
                                                 
85 In the sense of not fulfilling a transversality condition given by the stream of future current account 




international financial system.  These two distinct outcomes for Britain and the US 
are stylized facts that ought to be incorporated in future theoretical formulations of 
the problem. The pattern of a creditor country investing in safe assets while a debtor 
country prefers to invest in securities with a higher profile of risk could be 
endogenous, and this hypothesis could only be suggested after the completion of this 
dissertation. 
The results of this work are significant and will play an important part in our 
understanding of the international monetary system, the role of the global reserve 
currency, the advantages derived by Britain from the centrality of the pound sterling, 
as well as the dynamics of the modern US. It is also my hope that by exploiting 
further the dataset and the methodology presented here, the experiences of the past 






A1 American Railways 
One important subset of the data used in this paper is US railroads. The US 
was the major destination of British capital during the period of study, receiving 
20.5% of the total British capital called between 1865 and 1914 (Canada was in 
second place with 10.1%, Stone 1999). The US was the top destination of British 
capital in all but two five year intervals- 1875-79 and 1885 - 1889 (and in these, it 
was number two respectively after Australia and Argentina, with only minor 
differences). Railways received 61.6% of the British capital destined to America from 
1865 to 1914, followed by industrial & miscellaneous (10.8%). In years like 1894, 
1902 and 1903, railways received more than 90% of the British capital destined to the 
US. The US was the number one destination for British capital invested in railways 
for all 5-year periods after 1870. Figure 18, which presents the information of the 
middle panel of Figure 2 (railroads) by class of asset, shows that the US received the 





Figure 18: Share of each country in total British railroads investments (1869 - 1914) 
by class of investment (percentage) 
The database contains 574 securities for American railroads, spanning January 




prices). Based on the uniquely defined names of the securities and the currency in 
which capital is denominated, I created five groups of securities: 
1) Total capital denominated in pound sterling.86 
2) Total capital denominated in dollars and without any clauses.  
3) Total capital denominated in dollars and including a gold clause.  
4) Total capital denominated in dollars and including a sterling clause.  
5) Common stocks. 87 
The top left panel of Figure 19 shows the number of securities listed by each 
type in each year. The number of securities denominated in dollars was similar to the 
number in pounds around 1875 and both remained stable until around 1895, when the 
number of securities denominated in dollars increased while the number of securities 
quoted in pounds slowly declined. The number of common stock shares seems to be 
constant. The major source of dynamics from the panel comes from the rapid 
expansion of the number of securities quoted in dollars with gold clauses. Between 
1880 and 1895, securities payable in dollars with gold clauses became the most 
important type being issued by railway companies at the London Stock Exchange. 
This might be related to the fear that silver would be added to the monetary base of 
the US at this time. After 1895, a decline occurs in securities with gold clauses, 
matched by an increase in dollar securities without gold clauses. The subsequent 
                                                 
86 Some securities do not contain currency symbols. In some cases, it was possible to determine the 
currency by the denomination of the share - the total capital represented the number of shares. The 
IMM also started quoting some securities in dollars and switched to pounds after some time even if the 
value of capital did not change, which is clearly a mistake. The confusion may be caused by the fact 
that securities without symbols were by default in pounds before the creation of a special section for 
American railways. I attempted to determine the genuine currency of the quotation. See technical 
appendix for details. 




reduction in American shares and dollar securities in London may be due to the 
ascension of the New York Stock Exchange. 
The top right panel shows the total amount of capital for each group in 
millions of pounds sterling. A slightly different picture arises. A fast expansion of 
issuance of capital is detected, especially for dollar securities without gold or sterling 
clauses after 1895.88 Until that period, the main form of railway financing was 
through common stocks (called “dollar stocks” in Figure 19). The value of common 
stocks and dollar denominated securities with gold clauses also expand after 1905. 
American railroad firms acquired British capital first by issuing common stock, then 
by dollar securities with gold clauses and finally by pure dollar securities, with a 
further expansion in common shares and more dollar denominated securities with 
gold clauses following 1905. Most types of railway bonds were mortgages backed by 
real assets and, hence, firms in possession of more land, miles of tracks and rolling 
stock could issue more debt. By comparing the number of securities (from the first 
panel) and the value of securities in the second panel, it is possible to conclude that 
common shares and dollar denominated securities without clauses had on average a 
higher unitary value. Since the number of securities was not expanding after 1900, 
this means that the average unitary value of securities was expanding.  
                                                 
88 This may be a consequence of the 1896 US presidential election.  Since the main issue of the 
election was whether the US would stick to gold or switch to bimetallism, the victory of William 
McKinley (the sound-money candidate favoring gold) against William Jennings Bryan (the populist 
candidate advocating the coinage of silver in order to generate inflation) may have been seen by 
international investors as a watershed event confirming the US’ commitment to gold. Thanks to 
Professor John Shea for indicating this. Another possibility is described by Edelstein (1982): 
“Following considerable financial distress in the 1893 – 96 depression, the financial structures of many 
U.S. railway companies were radically reorganized and many companies disappeared through 
consolidation. By 1902, “morganization” had resulted in a much more concentrated industry with 70 
percent of the U.S. trackage controlled by eight great railways systems and a shift of external financing 
arrangements into the hands of a few elite Wall Street firms.” Also, “the new industrial giants issued 




Finally, the two lower panels report the coupon yield for each category, with 
the exception of common shares. The lower left panel shows unweighted averages 
and the right-hand panel shows yields weighted by capital. The striking pattern is the 
reduction in yield for almost every category during this period. Pound securities 
yields are usually lower than those from pure dollar securities until 1890. Dollar 
denominated securities with gold or sterling clauses offer the lowest yields for almost 
the entire period.  After 1900 yields on pure dollar and pound securities reach new 
lows. The presence of gold clauses reduced the yield to British investors for most of 
the period (making capital cheaper for American firms). At some points in time, the 









































































































A1.1 A New Measure of US External Liabilities before WWI 
Railway securities were the largest British investment in the US. Since Britain 
was the largest source of available capital, these securities constituted a large share of 
the US external liabilities for that time. A proxy for the dynamics of US external 
liabilities can be compiled by using the same techniques presented above for the UK 
external position.  
Figure 20: New series for American International Liabilities. shows US 
external liabilities in market and issuance prices in millions of pounds sterling (top 
panel) and as a percentage of US GDP (bottom panel).89 Acknowledging that these 
series include only investment in railroads by British investors, this is the first 
monthly market value estimate at market prices of the external liabilities of the US for 
the period 1869-1914. External liabilities in terms of millions of sterling pounds 
increased steadily for almost the whole period and at a faster rate than GDP from 
1869 to 1895. Both series went from close to zero to around 20% of GDP by the year 
1895. As a share of GDP, the issuance price series stops growing around 1895 and the 
market price series around 1900. The two series are close until the turn of the 
twentieth century with the issuance price series slightly above the market price series, 
which means that capital gains were slightly negative.90 This pattern changes after 
1900, when the market price series grows at a faster rate than the issuance price 
series. By 1914, the issuance price series decreases to around 17% of GDP, while the 
market price series increases to around 25% of GDP. The stabilization after 1900 may 
                                                 
89 Nominal GDP comes from series Ca184 of Carter et al. (2006). Since the original series was in 
pounds sterling, the GDP data was also converted to pounds. 
90 
This is consistent with Wilkins (2009): “in the mid-1890s, 60 to 70 percent of the capital stock of 




be a consequence of the cooling of the American railway sector. Taking into account 
the whole period until 1900, capital gains were not large. After 1900 capital gains 
increase and reach a cumulative value of around 10% of GDP by 1914. 
 GR (2014) find that capital gains for US net external assets amount to close 
to 5% of GDP in the period 2001-2010 (and much lower from 1970 to 2000). 
Although not stated directly by the authors, the increase in the importance of the 
valuation effect seems to be a direct consequence of the opening of financial markets 
that happened especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a reversal of the 
trend after the Great Depression. The relevance of valuation effects for the period 
before the First World War is a testimony to the degree of market integration at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Valuation effects were already economically large 
for the US and UK, at least in terms of portfolio liabilities. The result is expected, in 
the sense that the US was an emerging market importing capital from Britain. 
Figure 21  compares the market price series (both in levels and as a percentage 
of GDP) to the series compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, starting from 
1970) and to GR (2007, from 1952). US external liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
were actually higher in 1914 than in 1952 or 1970. Since two world wars and the 
ascension of the US as main global creditor marked the period between these years, 
the decrease of external liabilities seems adequate. Finally, Table 6: US External 
Liabilities (USD MM): Comparison to figures from Lewis (1975) compares the 
issuance price series with estimates from Lewis (1975), the only other existing source 
for the US external position during the pre-1914 period.91 The new estimates are 
                                                 




usually lower than the original source, which is natural, given that this section’s 
sample only considers railway securities bought by British investors. Moreover, the 
numbers from Lewis (1975) prior to 1914 include direct investment (which amounted 
to one quarter of portfolio investment in 1914).92 Since the collection of data for the 
new series starts in 1869, the figure for that year seems to be problematic. 
                                                 
92A further cross-check will be implemented by using the data regarding dividends and coupon 
payments for each security. A comparison with the income account of the US is possible. In this 
particular comparison, the issue of the IMM taking in account the total capital of American railways, 
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Table 6: US External Liabilities (USD MM): Comparison to figures from Lewis 
(1975). Numbers with asterisks indicate that direct investment is included. 
 
 
Figure 21: Comparison with series from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and GR 
(2007). (In black and white charts, the right-hand side axis corresponds to the upper 






A.2 Technical Appendix 
A2.1 Series under the same amount of capital 
Securities 30238 and 30241 had the capital value merged from March 1873 to 
November 1887. The original issuance of 30238 was GBP 800,000 and for 30241 
was GBP 2 million, but these values decreased over time because of redemptions 
related to sinking funds. Both were sterling bonds from Baltimore and Ohio, but 
30238 with maturity of 1895 and 30241 with maturity of 1902. I split the values by 
using the values of the independent series after December 1887 and by making 
assumptions for the values before that. I also used the prices and paid values of 30238 
to 30241 from March 1873 to April 1874. The information came from the Stock 
Exchange Year Book of 1883. 
I used the values for February 1876 to backtrack the values of 33234, 33236, 
33237 from January1869 to January 1876. 
For 33750 and 33752, the value of USD 20MM from January 1869 to April 
1871 referred to the whole amount of liabilities in the form of securities of the firm, 
including bonds detained by the State of Pennsylvania (USD 6,232,754.93) that 
probably were not negotiated in the market (The Economist, December 12 1868 -
Page 1436). The value of the series after May 1874 seems to be the most accurate 
one, but I adopted the USD 5MM as close enough. 
For securities 32027, 32046 and 34676, the value of March 1870 was used as 
reference for April and May of 1870. 
For securities 32780, 32801 and 32803, the value of August/1873 was used as 




I determined that series 30155, 31479, 31481, 31482, 32990 and 35149 were 
of extraordinary nature and hence we considered only the companion securities. 
Respectively: 30153, 33267, 31477, 31477, 32991 and 30204. 
A2.2 Determination of currency 
30204 Atlantic & Gt. Westn. Do 7% do (guar. By Erie) Pounds 
30979 Chicago St Paul & Kansas 1st mort. 5 % bonds red. After 1896 at 105 
Dollars / Fall in June1893 is due to restructuring. See manual of Statistics 
1895, page 58. 
32199 Illinois Central Railroad 5% Sterling Sinking Fund Bond, before 1903 
 Dollars until Dec. 1889, pounds afterwards / Stock Exchange Yearbook 
1882 and 1902 Moody's Manual of Corporation Securities Page 431 
32393 Lehigh Valley 6 % Consolidated Mortgage "A". Pounds / IMM March 
1874 Page 117 
33753 Pennsylvania Do general Mortgage 6 per cent. Sterling 1910 Dollars until 
Dec. 1882, pounds after. The value is different because the mortgage was 
split in 3 securities with the same total value (two of them probably went 
to the US). The breakdown can be found at page 29 of the The 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company Annual Report from 1902. 
35039 Philadelphia and Erie Do 6% General Mortgage, 1920 (issued at 87 1/2). 
Pounds / After October 1895 dollars 
33788 Allegheny Valley Rail. 6 % Gold or 7% Currency Mort. 1910 Dollars / 





A2.3 Securities corrections 
Old Code New Code Period and Notes 
31489 31490 December 1907 - July 
1914 
31490 31489 December 1907 - July 
1914 
33262 31471  
33265 31477  
35183 33266 March 1879 / 33266 is the 
fusion of 31476 and 31478 
35184 33270  
33280 33266 33266 merges into 33270 
in August 1883 
33268 31479  
33663 33660 March and April 1888 
33762 33751 December 1887 and 
January 88 
34520 34504  
34518 34505  
34515 34503  
34446 34447 April 1894 - May 1905 
30167 30166 October 1911 - July 1914 
30211 30213 May 1880 - September 
1880 
31490 31477 May 1900 - July 1914 
33271 31489 April 1879 - April 1900 
31469 33272 January 1883 - March 
1896 
33272 31480 April 1879 - March 1896 
30347 30247 January 1894 - June 1894 
30483 30841 January 1883 - December 
1899 
30973 30958 January 1912 - July 1914 
32230 32229 January 1874 - January 
1882 / Indicated by Yale 
ICF 
33296 30187 November 1880 - June 
1881 
33291 30192 November 1880 - June 
1881 
33761 33755 Feb. 1878 - April 81 / Dec. 
81 - Dec. 82 
33755 33761 Oct. 1870 - Dec. 75 / Feb. 





32867 32714 September 1871 - July 
1891 
30423 31445 May 1901 - December 
1906 / Eastern of 
Massachusetts becomes 
Boston and Maine 
31616 31637 Feb/1901 - Apr/01 
31652 31644 Mar/02 
31649 31660 Nov/01 - May/02 
33595 31645 Apr/93 - Jan/94 
31652 31645 Jan/03 - Jul/14 
31652 31644 Oct/02 - Dec/02 
31617 31611 Feb/94 - Jul/14 
31678 31674 Jan/99 - Jul/14 (- May/99) 
31813 31761 Jan/03 - Jul/14 (- May/03) 
31730 31791 Jan/69 - Dec/79 
31807 31791 Feb/87 - Jul/14 
31802 31799 Jan/83 - Jul/14 
31822 31809 Jan/94 - Set/95 
31806 32363 Aug/84 - Oct/84 
31082 31081 Jan/Feb 95 
31113 31102 Jan/90 - Jul/14 
31114 31108 Jan/90 - Set/08 
31192 31189 May/99 - Jul/14 
31327 31324 Set/72 - Dez/82 
31324 31327 Nov/93 - Jun/08 
31467 31458 Jan/08 - Jul/14 
31560 31549 Jan/74 - Jun/74 and Set/74 
- Apr/81 
31574 31547 Jan/83 - Jul/14 
30119 30111 Feb/08 - Apr/08 
30111 30119 Set/08 - Nov/08 
32382 30212 May/1899 - Jan 1905 
30376 30375 Jan/14 - Jul/14 
30375 30376 Apr/14 - Jul/14 
30795 31040 May - Jul/14 
31895 31859 Feb/82 - Apr/82 
31882 31872 Dec/82 - Jul/14 
31891 31899 Nov/89 - Sep/91 
31919 31951 Feb/88 - Apr/88 




31958 31950 Jan/91 - Jun/91 
31907 31953 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
31975 31992 Apr/76 - Dec/82 
31976 31989 Dec/12 - Jul/14 
31892 31893 May/76 - Dec/87 
32107 32104 Jan/93 - Jul/14 
32136 32137 May/09 - Jul/14 
32180 32176 Aug/90 - Jul/14 
32176 32180 Aug/90 - Jul/14 
32176 32177 Jun/82 - Jan/84 
32177 32176 Jun/82 - Jan/84 
32373 32341 Mar/95 - Apr/95 
32399 32404 Jan/69 - Apr/76 
32410 32407 Feb/98 - Apr/98 
32662 32647 Sep/70 - Dec/82 
32650 32651 Jun/85 - Dec/85 and 
Feb/86 - Aug/86 
32673 32678 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
32675 32677 Sep/76 - Dec/82 
32754 32753 Feb/03 - Apr/03 
32753 32754 Feb/03 - Apr/03 
32749 32746 Jul/72 - Dec/76 
32813 32784 Jan/77   
32829 32823 Feb/07 - Apr/07 
32868 32872 Jul/84 - Jan/01 
32902 32904 Aug/92 - Jun/93 
35017 32883 Jan/79 - Aug/81 
32942 32932 Oct/12 - Jul/14 
32944 32921 Jan/13 - Apr/14 and 
Dec/13 - Jul/14 
33045 33018 Jan/89 - Apr/89 
33034 33029 Mar/75 - Apr/86 
33050 33051 Apr/98 
33051 33050 Apr/98 
33044 33022 Jan/83 - Sep/97 
33070 33063 Jan/83 - Jul/14 
35137 33100 Jan/83 - Jun/83 
33184 33183 Dec/85 - Jun/97 
33201 33200 Jan/07 - Jul/14 
33349 33341 Oct/04 - Jul/14 
33400 3451 Sep/88 - Dec/94 




33461 33435 Jan/08 - Jul/14 
33433 33442 Oct/80 - Dec/83 
33520 33525 and 33526 Jan/83 
34690 33517 Feb/87 - Jul/14 
33565 33572 Nov/95 - Jul/14 
35561 33564 Jan/69 - Feb/73 
33599 35182 Feb - Mar/76 
35182 31980 Feb - Mar/76 
31980 33599 Feb - Mar/76 
33690 33687 Jan/81 - Nov/95 - (Jan/Apr 
95) 
33699 33687 Jan/95 - Dec/99 
34693 33697 Feb/94 - Dec/99 - 
(May/Nov 94) 
33719 33711 Jan/83 - Jan/89 
33746 33743 May/82 - Nov/82 
33743 33746 May/82 - Nov/82 
35110 33841 Jan/Mar/69 and May - 
Aug/69 
33869 33867 Jan - Apr/06 
33879 33877 Mar/10 - Sep/12 
33985 33980 Feb - Apr/74 
34011 34021 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
35000 34059 Jan/86 
34089 34088 May - Nov/72 
34109 34114 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
34198 34203 Sep/82 - Dec/82 
34313 34312 Mar - Apr/89 
34356 34346 Jan/83 - Sep/88 
34456 34460 Jan/1901 - Apr/1906 
34497 34495 Feb, Apr / 95 
34495 34497 Oct- Nov/95 
34547 34644 Mar/1904 
34644 34547 Mar/1904 
34601 34603 Jan/95 - Jul/14 
35157 30546 Dec/93 - Nov/94 
34657 30489 Aug/96 - Feb/97 
35198 34660 Dec/72 - Jan/73 
34660 30368 Dec/72 - Feb/73 
30623 35087 Nov/82 
35107 31268 Mar, May - Aug/69 




31274 31276 Jan/90 - Dec/06 
35100 31341 Jan/69 - Nov/71 
31344 31342 Jan/69 - Nov/71 
35103 31415 Jan/69 - Dec/69 
31422 31415 Jan/77 - Jul/84 
34653 31611 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
31772 31750 Apr/74 
32056 34676 Jun/69 
34676 32056 Jun/69 
35538 X   
32335 32365 Jan/69 - Dec/79 
35003 32800 May/81 - Jun/83 
35105 32787 Jan - Apr/73 
35203+35204 32847 Jan - Feb/69 
32814 31688 From Aug/1897 
32813 31683 From Aug/1897 
32808 31684 From Aug/1897 
32803 31701 From Aug/1897 
32801 31700 From Aug/1897 
32800 31687 From Aug/1897 
32798 31693 From Aug/1897 
32799 31682 From Aug/1897 
32790 31691 From Aug/1897 
32789 31690 From Aug/1897 
32788 31681 From Aug/1897 
32786 31702 From Aug/1897 
32782 31692 From Aug/1897 
32780 31699 From Aug/1897 
32777 31697 From Aug/1897 
32775 31689 From Aug/1897 
32766 31698 From Aug/1897 
32765 31696 From Aug/1897 
32809 31685 From Aug/1897 
32816 31686 From Aug/1897 
32818 31694 From Aug/1897 
32818 31694 From Aug/1897 
32796 31695 From Aug/1897 
32819 31724 From Aug/1897 
32817 31723 From Aug/1897 
35167 33199 May / Jun 02 




30524 30815 Aug/02 - Oct/08 
30807 30809 Aug/02 - Oct/08 
30525 30799 Aug/02 - Oct/08 
30808 30513 Nov/08 - Jul/14 
31257 31292 Jan/07 - Jul/14 
31155 32140 Oct/98 - Feb/02 
31411 32728 Jul/82 - Apr/88 
31409 32727 Aug/81 - Apr/83 
31410 32729 Dec/82 - Apr/83 
31503 33439 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
31504 33440 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
32076 32065 Jun/89 - Jul/14 
30051 30052 Oct/91 - Dec/91 
30052 30051 Oct/91 - Dec/91 
30095 30669 Jan/69 - Dec/82 
30306 30309 May/95 - Jul/14 
30720 30704 Jan/85 - Sep/85 
31075 31071 Dec/09 
31293 31277 Mar/00 - Dec/06 
31302 31305 Jan/73 - Oct/80 
31417 31414 Jan/69 - Dec/70 
33695 33691 Feb/88 - Dec/99 
35127 33841 May/76 - Set/76 
31983 33840 May/76 - Feb/92 
31998 33843 May/76 - Feb/92 
31477 31822 Aug/77 - Jan/92 
32456 31780 Jan/69 – Dec/71  
Feb/92 – Jul/14 
32457 31764 Jan/69 – Dec/71  
Feb/92 – Jul/14 
32458 X  
35164 X  
35185 33484 Mar/79 
33486 33502 May/71 – Jul/71 
33473 33502 Mar/71 – Apr/71 
35182 32001 Jan/76 – Apr/76 
31266 31989 Jan/69 – Feb/75 
31267 31977 Sep/69 – Feb/75 
31265 31997 Jan/69 – Feb/75 
33599 31997 Mar/75 – Apr/76 
33598 31264 Mar/75 – May/76 




(Apr, May discarded) 
34363 34364 Dec/79 
35205 34359 Jan/69 
30513 30519 Jun/89 – Jul/14 
31094 34663 Feb/13 – Jul/14 
31595 31580 Jan/98 – Feb/99 (Prices) 
31580 31595 Jan/98 – Feb/99 (Prices) 
31699 32776 Jan/73 
31730 31791 Jan/69 – Feb/69 
35177 and 35178 33151 Jan/69 – Mar/69 
33331 33329 Dec/87-May/90 
11029 11028 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
10912 10909 May/88 – Dec/02 
11072 11071 Oct/10 – Dec/11 
11069 11071 Jan/13 – Jul/14 
32553 32547 Feb/Mar 94 
32558 32553 Apr/94 – Jul/14 
32553 32558 Apr/94 – Jul/14 
10224 10229 Mar/1878 – Out/1902 
10014 10231 Mar/86 – Feb/96 
10232 10014 Jan/83 – Feb/86 
10566 10523 Feb/02 – Out/02 
10820 10821 Jan/96 – Oct/98 
10264 10014 Mar/86 – Jun/10 
10671 10601 Jan/92 – Jul/14 
10806 10794 Feb/88 – Dec/05 
11007 10930 Dec/07 – Sep/10 
11005 10930 Oct/10 – Sep/13 
11421 11420 Nov/11 – Dec/90 
11441 11450 Jan/77 – Dec/77 
11520 11512 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
11527 11526 Jan/71 – Dec/72 
11533 11534 Jan/84 – Jan/97 
11530 11529 Jan/07 – Jul/14 
11557 11555 Feb/11 – Dec/12 
11647 11618 Jan/77 – Dec/83 
11643 11612 Jan/77 – Jan/91 
11642 11638 Jan/79 – Dec/87 
11669 11662 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
11820 11813 Sep/1906 – Dec/07 




10011 10007 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
10012 10005 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
11877 10006 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
11890 11888 Feb/88 – Jul/88 
11889 11907 Sep/88 – Jan/89 
12243 12232 Jan/69 – Aug/71 
12385 12383 Apr/74 – Dec/78 
12319 12302 Aug/90 – Dec/90 
12297 12319 Aug/90 – Jan/03 
12496 12333 Jan/79 – Jun/94 
12509 12331 Mar/83 – Oct/89 
12329 12336 Jan/71 – Jan/73 
11918 12456 Nov/71 – Dec/71 
11917 11919 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
12426 12408 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
12428 12410 Feb/69 – Dec/70 
12403 12411 Jan/69 – Dec/70 
12427 12403 Apr/69 – Dec/70 
12412 11537 Feb/71 – Jul/78 
12443 12442 Aug/90 
10906 11338 Sep/88 – Aug/89 
11278 11348 Jan/69 – Dec/71 
11984 11365 Jan/07 – Jul/14 
11336 10902 Sep/89 – Apr/94 
12074 12868 Dec/69 – Jan/74 
10188 X  
   





A3 Robustness for Calculation of Exorbitant Privilege 
 
Table 7: Exorbitant Privilege for the period 1869-1914 (% of GDP): Variation in the 





Table 8: Exorbitant Privilege for the period 1869-1914 (% of GDP): Variation in the 
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